

DE BOW'S REVIEW.

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ART. I—EXODUS.

We should have premised that the Southern people, like the children of Israel, must undergo a total obliteration of all usages except those of devotion to God and the principles of virtue. God deemed it necessary to the success of his chosen people that they should be prepared for their great mission of political independence. To do this, he made them a new polity. It was based on obedience to His divine and moral law. The forty years' wandering over a space geographically not wider than from St. Louis to San Francisco, effectually extinguished all the ideas which an unregulated bondage had implanted. It had even annihilated by death and senility all those who had directed the councils of Israel. It even left the great legislative agent of the Almighty on the border of Canaan, and deemed but two worthy, for their innocent excellence, to see the culmination of the divine plan. But the Israelites, who deployed upon the plains of Jericho, were a people wholly different from those who had trod mortar and moulded brick for the Egyptians. From slaves they had become soldiers—the highest human elevation. From a few superstitious tribes they had become a highly organized nation. They had a religious principle; they had a political system; they had the arts; they wielded arms; consequently they triumphed over the helpless hordes that had pre-occupied the fair land that God had assigned them. As a result, the nations which surrounded them were but as the wheat before the reaper. They entered, subjugated and possessed the lands held by every people whose civilization and endowments were inferior to their own.

We return from this illustration of the material regeneration of the Southern States to the practical methods by which it may be effected.

The power of the South, with its representatives in the Federal government, will depend upon its popular numbers. Whether

the basis of national power be the physical force wielded in the field, or the representation in a common council, it depends alike upon the numerical aggregations which it can command. It is wholly useless to rely upon compacts, which have no guaranty except the integrity of purpose on the part of those who enter upon them. History is filled with these broken pledges and their sad consequences. Religion had added her sacred sanction to the temporal obligations of monarchs and of peoples, and yet these sacred considerations have not prevented Protestantism from throwing off its obligations to the head of the visible church, nor has it prevented one phase of Protestant faith from oppressing another. Our honest and excellent ancestors acted upon the idea that all others were as sincere as themselves. They therefore made a compact by which they supposed their own rights would be protected. The relative rights of all parties to that compact are now practically remitted to the original and universal arbiter—the relative ability of each party to impress its own construction upon any compact to which it may be a party. How, then, may the Southern States best provide themselves with the material upon which this ability depends? The Southern States have one obstacle among themselves to the organization of numbers—a large proportion of their population is of a color and social status different from that of the whites. It is true, this class represents in some respects that amount of ignorance and vicious indulgence against which society must everywhere protect itself; but it represents a capacity for production highly valuable, and not rashly to be excluded from the country. This class must be protected, enlightened and utilized. It must, however, be kept in its present position; it must be governed by superior intelligence; it must be protected in its political rights, without allowing its physical or social amalgamation. This is the problem for Southern solution. To do this will require the importation of white numbers, of capital, and the adoption of mechanical agencies. The first of these two objects require the same policy. It is to convince the capitalist, or the operative who seeks the South, that his person and property will be safe, and the investment of either money or muscle will be remunerative. We do not belong to that class of philosophers that thinks the South should sit by the turbid stream of national strife until the waters all flow past and the channel is dry. Never, perhaps, in our day, or any other, will the volcano of American politics be inactive. The war of sections has been transferred to the halls of Congress. There it may be expected to continue as long so there are representatives to combat each other.

Capital is timid and commercial enterprise, to some extent, cautious; but both will go where the prospect of profit attracts. They followed and preceded the Federal armies in the cotton fields of the South; they invested in our blockade-runners, in our confiscated lands, in our plundered property. They are already

seeking the unsettled South in the purchase of lands, in shipping, machinery, merchandise, in barges, elevators and the cattle trade. The money disturbances of the North impel investments of currency in the South. Neither political anarchy, nor absurd reports of personal danger to Northern immigrants, can deter this immigration. The Southern State Legislatures should, then, increase the attractions to immigrant numbers as far as possible.

We will take up, systematically, the mode by which the great problem stated may be worked out. We propose to take the first step in this Exodus by which we leave the land of bondage without going out of our native country. It is the means by which we exorcise the foul spirits that have invaded and tormented us, and practically escape the burdens which we have borne and are bearing.

I—IMMIGRATION.

We may assume the colored population of the Southern States at three millions, and that of the whites at seven and a half. In some sections of the Southern States there is a local majority of colored people, and for the present, such restrictions have been thrown around the white vote that it is in a practical minority. The majority of the Northern and Western States is very great. Perhaps this population may be stated in round numbers at twenty-five millions, of which seventeen millions inhabit the valley of the Mississippi. The seven and a half millions of Southern whites constitute, then, one-fifth of the electoral and representative power of the nation. If the colored vote can be harmonized with the white vote of the South, then the Southern vote rises to nearly one-third of the whole. To reinstate the South in its former relations to the government will require the conciliation of the colored vote. This will be done, 1. By giving the protection and political rights herein stated; 2. By demonstrating a community of political interest between the whites and colored people.

II—THE IMMIGRATION OF WHITE NUMBERS.

To effect this object, inducements must be offered of the most attractive character. The political rights assured to all by existing legislation are so uniform that foreigners can come into the South upon as favorable terms as they can go into any other State.* The advantages of education and of social recognition are as great in the South as elsewhere, and the former of these advantages must be still more enlarged. Southern lands must be offered on as good terms as any others. The government of the

* It is to be noted that the right of suffrage was extended to all white persons in some of the Southern States before it was done in some of the Free States.

United States is a formidable competitor in the land market. It has gift lands and parchment titles. The Southern titles are, on the other hand, derivative, and therefore subject to some doubt. The values are not fixed, and are therefore susceptible of more or less difficulty of adjustment, when the purchaser is often a stranger to the language of the seller. To establish a competition between the private land titles of the South and the public titles of the government, will require an organized presentation and verification of the private land titles; also, a valuation of our lands, with a fixed obligation on the part of the owners to sell and make title. This will require a Land Registry at all the principal ports of the South, in which these evidences of title and value shall be recorded. Immigrants and their agents may thus ascertain the situation, title and price of the lands.

III—PROTECTION TO IMMIGRANTS.

The passenger act of 1864 provides for organizing a Bureau of Immigration in the State Department. It creates the office of Superintendent of Immigration, at the port of New York, whose duty it shall be to see that the immigrant has the benefit of the laws for his protection, and that he is not deceived or defrauded on his landing, and passage to the interior. The provisions of this act should be extended to the port of New Orleans, and to all other outlets of the Western interior. There should be a depot for the reception and protection of immigrants. Not only should the Federal government aid in the appropriations necessary to give effect to this arrangement, but all the States interested in receiving immigrants through the outports should unite in the same object. The interior States and the immigrant would then have the benefit of competing lines, and the Southern people would participate in the great national provision to induce population to come into the Republic.

ART. II—CAREY ON RECONSTRUCTION.*

Words are powers. They are often realities in themselves. They are frequently evidences of accomplished change, or agencies in the production of change. They reveal, or they determine an altered habit of thought. The term Reconstruction is ominous. It does not exhibit simply a quibble about phrases, like the celebrated argument of Demosthenes in regard to the surrender or the restoration of Halonnesus. It argues a foregone conclu-

* Reconstruction: Industrial, Financial and Political. Letters to the Hon. Henry Wilson, U. S. Senator from Massachusetts. By Henry C. Carey. Published by the United Press Association. Washington. 1868. Pp. 79.

sion, and its unhesitating acceptance shows that the conclusion is in conformity with the tendency of the public thought and with the results of popular conviction. In the present agitations and discords of the United States the purpose of Restoration is not contemplated. Reconstruction and Reorganization are the substitutes proposed. Montesquien proclaims that the only remedy for the maladies of republican governments is a recurrence to the original principles on which they were founded. Such a return is rarely possible; the universal adoption of the term Reconstruction for the settlement of the disorder consequent upon the War of Secession shows that the recourse to the anterior political condition of the country is an imagined mode of cure. The old order of things has passed away, never to be recalled. A new order cometh; what it may be cannot yet be discerned: but it will be unlike what preceded it. Such is the intuitive admission in all parts of the country, evinced by the currency of the unwelcome phrase, Reconstruction. Sad as may be the confession, we are compelled to acknowledge that here the popular determination is right, both in respect to fact and in respect to policy. The shadow will not go back on the dial of Ahaz—the movement of humanity is continuous, notwithstanding its course often appears stationary or retrograde. In natural changes it is equally foolish and vain to put the hand to the plough and look backwards. At all hazards and in despite of all miseries and sufferings the world must go forward.

Per damna, per cædes, ab ipso
Ducit opes animunque ferro.

Its agony gives it strength and speed. It must go on; it cannot go back; "*nulla vestigia retrorsum.*" The flaming sword of the archangel interposes between it and the paradise from which it has been expelled. There is no choice offered. Blessings may be conquered from the future; the past can neither be reanimated nor recalled. The condition may be hard but it must be accepted.

Gen. Bank's declaration at Arlington Heights in the first months of the war was a just and profound reflection. The spirit, if not the form of the government was changed when the first gun was fired, when the first invasion of a sovereign and co-equal State occurred. Political forms are in process of time always brought into harmony with the prevailing political spirit. The decision of Pope Zachary in 751, that the royal dignity should be incident to the possession of the royal power, whereby the Carolingian race was raised to the throne of France, was only the special application of a universal principle, which has received recent illustration in the election of Louis Napoleon to the French empire, and is receiving daily exemplification in the revolutions of the current age.

No one, we suppose, except the old and despondent, the young and enthusiastic, the ignorant and bewildered, dreams that it

is any longer possible or desirable to restore the ancient order of things. All the circumstances which favored the loose social organization, the easy political freedom, the absence of restraint, are altered; the fortunes, the pursuits, the prospects, the reciprocal relations of the population, throughout the South at least, are entirely changed. "*Tempora mutantur.*" We are adrift on the waves; without anchorage, and beyond soundings. Our ancient habitations have been thrown down by the violence of the convulsion; we stand in the midst of the ruins of our fortunes and of our hopes; and we must construct new and humbler tabernacles with the wrecks of our former prosperity. Reconstruction alone is possible henceforward; and all that is of practical significance at this moment is to determine the character which that reconstruction should assume.

The Southern States are powerless to decide the issue. Their bow has been broken, their spear shattered in their hands, their right arm paralysed. Complaint is as futile as passionate recalcitration. They must wait, submit, and observe. They may indirectly and ultimately affect the result to be attained, however powerless they may be to expedite or to shape that result. There is, at least, an urgent necessity for them to study and appreciate the significance of the times, and to adapt their action and their social arrangements to the progressive changes which they cannot prevent and which they must endure. They cannot control the revolution, but they may profit by it in its course, and may ameliorate its effects hereafter. The immediate duties of the South are limited to the unostentatious works of social and industrial activity in order to conquer subsistence and regain prosperity: political action it must leave for the present to the victors who claim and appropriate the spoils of conquest. It may renew its energies and its resources; it may increase its comforts, its culture and its wealth; but the expansion of civilization always in the end influences the government, or the relations of the population under the government. The revolution, through which we are still passing which eventuated in war and culminated in defeat and disaster, was in the main social and industrial; the recovery from its effects must consequently take place in the first instance in the constitution of society and the development of industry. Politics only furnished the occasion, the pretext, and the agency of civil discord, and now presents its prizes to the triumphant, its thorns to the vanquished; but political evils will be mitigated or removed as soon as the social and industrial reformation is achieved.

Under these circumstances, while denied all liberty of public action and restrained even in the manifestation of private enterprise, though under an imperative obligation to watch and apply the shifting gales of opinion, there is a special interest in appreciating the speculations of those among the dominant sections, who may be influential in deciding the policy of his country, and thus regulating our future condition, and repairing or aggravating our misfortunes.

Mr. Henry C. Carey, of Philadelphia, is one of the most original and daring thinkers in matters of political economy, which this country or this age has produced. He long ago acquired a most enviable reputation both at home and abroad, by his writings on this subject. He is diametrically opposed to Adam Smith, Ricardo, McCulloch, Mill and the Free Trade School, who have almost identified free trade with the science of political economy. We do not think the worse of him for this, as it indicates boldness, earnestness, sincerity. Moreover, though we have always accepted the free trade doctrine ourselves, we have never regarded them as of universal applicability, nor conceived them entitled to the absolute determination of all political arrangements. "Saul too is among the prophets;" for Mr. Carey claims to have foretold, on two occasions, the dissolution of the Union.

"Ten years since," says he, "after the occurrence of the great financial crisis of 1857, but in advance of his first message, I addressed Mr. Buchanan a private letter in which he was told that persistence in the policy of his predecessor would result in his own ruin and that of his party, and in dissolution of the Union." Letter XIII, pp. 69-70.

"Less than ten years since, I told Mr. Dallas, then in London, that dissolution of this Union would come about the time when the Capitol should be completed. In this I erred, the building being not even yet quite finished. Whether or not, when it shall be so, it will be the Capitol of all the existing States, is very doubtful." Letter II, p. 11.

Many persons, both before and after Mr. Cary, prophesied the dissolution of the Union; but his vaticinations have their own peculiar merit, as they were founded upon recondite and permanent principles of economical organization, which are as operative now as they were before the inauguration of civil war. With his merited prestige as Political Economist and Political Seer (has he not placed himself by the side of the Homeric Calchas by writing a work on "Past, Present and Future"), Mr. Carey now comes forward in a modest pamphlet, published not by himself, but by those who approve his teachings, to give his views upon the present tremendous crisis, and upon the means of extricating the country, and the whole country, from the fearful perils which environ it.

There is peculiar value in the reflections of Mr. Carey, since all his predispositions are of a Northern type. He is, and has ever been, opposed to slavery in practice and in theory; he is, and has ever been, the strenuous opponent of free trade; he is, and has always been, a consistent and eager protectionist; he believes in the moral, political, and historical preëminence of Pennsylvania; but, right or wrong in the measures advocated by him, he is solicitous of advancing the welfare of the whole country, and of reëstablishing and augmenting the general prosperity of the South. We may safely and gratefully listen to him, with the certainty of receiving instruction, if not with any assurance of conviction.

There is nothing but profit to be derived from attending to those who have heretofore differed in opinion from us, if they speak with kindness and honesty. There is great danger in hearkening only to those who are in harmony with our previous sentiments, for they confirm error, and strengthen us in conclusions which have been overthrown by arms, and which have been rendered inapplicable by defeat. We must recast our practical philosophy to make it harmonize with altered necessities. We cannot do this by feeding upon the past, and renewing a dissipated dream. We must turn, though with no credulous ear, to those whose whole habit of thought is diverse from our own, but more accordant with the changed systems under which we have to live and work. To no one can we recur with more confidence of receiving valuable and intelligent suggestions than to the distinguished gentleman who has rebuked the selfishness and blind exclusiveness of New England domination in these letters to Senator Wilson, of Massachusetts.

Mr. Carey is candid in the avowal of his opinions, and free from political bigotry in his judgments. He writes like a true votary of science, actuated by the pure love of truth, though fallible in his conclusions. He recognizes and declares that "Slavery did not make the rebellion." He ascribes the political discord, which resulted in civil war, to the collision between the interests of free trade and protection; and this is a partial explanation of the causes, though we should be inclined to interpret this collision in a very different manner from himself. He proclaims that "the only result thus far achieved has been that of a change of masters, Massachusetts having, so far as regards material interests generally, taken the place of South Carolina, and New England, at large, in reference to some of high importance, that of the States so recently in rebellion. Power has gone from the extreme South to the extreme North; and the sectionalism of to-day is likely, as I think, to prove quite as injurious as has already proved that of the past." Pp. 3-4. He declares further that "the Union is to-day, in my belief, more endangered than it had been in the years by which the war had been immediately preceded." P. 4. He afterwards furnishes the ground for this belief by asking, in regard to present arrangements and prospective tendencies, whether people "might not begin to see that sectionalism at the North was as greatly to be dreaded as sectionalism at the South? Might they not be led to arrive at the conclusion that the work of reconstruction could not be regarded as having been achieved so long as the whole nation should be required to aid in the construction of an inverted pyramid, the little apex of which was to find its place among the mills of Lowell and Manchester?" Letters VI, p. 30.

These brief passages will show the tenor of Mr. Carey's pamphlet, and the spirit in which it is composed. Of course we do not agree with him in asserting any Southern dictation or

domination before the war, though we unite in his apprehensions of the reign of "the universal Yankee nation." South Carolina was never a bugbear to us in the days of her pride and glory; she is an object of profound sympathy in her present agony and misfortunes. There may be apparent inconsistency in the acceptance of one line of the contrast and the rejection of the other; but we never could recognize the validity of the allegation, so early and so long employed at the North for sectional purposes, of Southern monopoly in the administration of the country. For the disproof of such an hypothesis, it seemed sufficient to compare the voting populations of the Northern and of the Southern States; to count the relative numbers of Northern and Southern Senators and Representatives; to contrast the expenditures of the public revenue at the North and at the South, and the modes of expenditures. It seemed sufficient to consider the resources and the aggregate revenues of Northern and Southern industry, and to estimate the ratio of the clear profit upon productions in the two sections, respectively, to be assured that his allegation of undue Southern ascendancy was a mere hallucination. That disparity of Northern and Southern resources which had such a decisive influence on the issue of the war had always been wide enough to preclude any unfair and unwarranted preponderance in the councils of the nation.

Mr. Carey ascribes, with much truth, the success of the Federal government in the late war to Pennsylvania iron and Pennsylvania coal. Iron and coal exist elsewhere, and most abundantly at the South; but nowhere else have they been worked with the same advantage and to the same extent. They are only types, however, of the inequality of Northern and Southern means, and wealth, and power—for power always attends natural wealth. As types they may be employed to exemplify the inferiority of Southern power, and to show the improbability of the alleged predominance of the South in the general government.

In 1860, the total product of coal in the United States was 14,334,922 tons, of which amount only 485,360 tons was produced in States included within the Southern Confederacy.

Of anthracite coal, the amount mined was 8,115,842 tons, all raised in Pennsylvania, with the exception of 1,000 tons obtained in Rhode Island.

Of bituminous coal, 2,934,512 tons was produced in Pennsylvania, and 1,500,000 in Ohio. Less than half a million of tons was mined in Virginia, Georgia, Alabama and Arkansas, and in this half million are included the cannel coal of Kanawha and the coals of Wheeling and other parts of West Virginia.

Coal means manufactures, population, trade, wealth, for it is the chief stimulant of all these things, and the indispensable preliminary to any great development of all. The next most important step in such development is supplied by the production of iron.

In 1860 the total product of iron blooms was 51,290 tons, and of pig iron 987,559 tons. Of this amount,

Pennsylvania produced.....	24,700	tons of blooms.
New York "	17,536	" "
Total.....	42,236	" "
Virginia, the only producing State within the Confederacy.....	825	" "
Pennsylvania produced.....	580,049	tons of pig iron.
New York "	74,645	" "
New Jersey "	51,875	" "
Maryland "	30,500	" "
New England "	26,600	" "
Western States "	187,300	" "
Total.....	950,769	" "

The total product of the States in possession of the Confederacy was 14,488 tons, from Virginia, Georgia, Alabama.

Thus, within the limits of the Confederate States, only one sixty-fifth part of the iron of the United States was produced. We do not require Mr. Carey to point out to us what effect this disproportion exercised on the fortunes of the war.

We cite these examples both for the direct illustration of that inequality of resources, which is incompatible with the supposition of Southern domination in the Federal government, and for the indirect illustration of the career of secession.

The inferiority of the South in industrial products, when compared to the North, has habitually been ascribed to imprudence, inactivity and the institution of slavery. This is entirely a different question from that just considered, but it merits notice, as it is brought by Mr. Carey into immediate connection with the conditions requisite for reconstruction. Slavery undoubtedly exercised some influence in determining this diversity; but Mr. Carey refers it mainly to the concentration of capital in New York and New England, to commercial legislation, to the construction of railroads converging to the great maritime cities of the North, and to other like arrangements. In his estimation, the neglect of manufactures and of mining industry at the South, is not to be referred to the improvidence or sluggishness of the Southern people, but to the systematic devices of New England politicians. He blames the South for playing into the hands of New England merchants, manufacturers and capitalists, by its advocacy of the systems of free trade; but this question we are not solicitous to reopen, as the expediencies of the past were entirely distinct from the necessities of the present and the future. Moreover, there is a singular confusion in his employment of the term Free Trade. He denounces the free trade doctrines of New England, when no such doctrine exists or has ever prevailed. New England desires free trade in raw materials, and limited protection in manufactures. But the free trade doctrine is all-

embracing, and does not admit of such division; the protective doctrine does admit it. What Mr. Carey assails in New England is what we should call protective—and unequal protection for local interests. Free trade certainly demands the absence of protection in manufactures as much as in raw materials.

We are indebted to Mr. Carey for some valuable information in regard to the mode and devices by which the manufacturing system of New England has been created, and the colossal fortunes the New England magnates have built up. He explains at the same time how the prosperity of the Western States has been retarded, and the efforts of the Southern States repressed. He is merciless, though perfectly respectful, in the criticisms and censures of New England policy, which he addresses to the Senator from Massachusetts.

The New England scheme of legislation desires free trade in raw materials, because this cheapens their manufactures at the expense of the agriculturalist and the miner, and enables the manufactured product to enter into competition with other similar products in the markets of the world. It also increases the margin for fluctuations in price in the manufactured article, and for profits. New England desires protection for its manufactures, because it secures them a monopoly of the home market, and the certainty of a considerable profit at the expense of the domestic consumer.

Free trade is a benefit to the consumer and to the producer who can produce more cheaply than any of his competitors; it is an injury or an impediment to those whose productions are liable to be undersold. Protection is always an imposition on the consumer for the immediate benefit of the producer; and it is an especial burthen on the domestic consumer, who cannot go elsewhere for his supplies. But in New England the doctrines of Free Trade and of Protection have been curiously combined. The maxim designed for the markets of the world, "To buy cheap and to sell dear," has been applied to the exclusive advantage of the manufacturer. He seeks to buy his raw materials of all kinds at the cheapest rate, that he may sell his finished products at the highest. But there is an astute moderation in the employment of this principle of protection, which we thank Mr. Carey for bringing to our notice. A very high tariff would stimulate competition at home, reduce prices and profits by destroying this monopoly, and thus defeat the main purpose for which protection is sought. Hence the highest limit proposed by New England for protection is that which precludes rival enterprise and sustains the existing monopoly. In this scheme, all the price that exceeds the lowest cost of production anywhere is loss to the purchaser, and it is nearly all clear gain to the manufacturers. If the amount of the protection were lowered, the profits of the manufacturers would be reduced; if it were raised, competition at home would set in, prices would fall, profits would be diminished, and New England profits might disappear altogether.

This policy has been deliberately applied to the prevention of Southern and Western industry, and to the augmentation of New England wealth. The desire of New England, and of those united with it in interest, has been to pay the least that is possible to the other sections for their products, and to exact the most that is possible from them for the manufactures sold in return. In 1857 Mr. Wilson said:

"The people of New England, and especially of Massachusetts, are very extensively engaged in the manufacture of articles in which wool, hemp, flax, lead, tin, brass and iron are largely consumed. It is for their interest that the duties on these articles should be merely nominal, or that they should be duty free."

Eleven years before, a Convention for New England had been held, the result of whose deliberations is thus given:

"We do not desire any protection that will stimulate domestic competition."

In these two extracts the whole policy of New England appears to be contained; in them is also to be found the explanation of the impotence of the Western States, the impoverishment and subjugation of the Southern States, the dissatisfaction of the great States of the centre. But the most important point to be considered in connection with them is the conclusion that Mr. Carey draws from these revelations of the past and present purposes of New England, in regard to the perils to the Union, menaced from that quarter, and the principles required in any effectual project of Reconstruction.

Mr. Carey exhibits in a startling form the consequences of the accumulation of wealth and power in New England by the means indicated. We use his words, not ours, in the delineation of the present relation of the Northeastern States to the whole Union:

"Five and thirty years have been by us expended in the effort to create an inverted pyramid, with its apex resting upon the cotton and woolen mills of Massachusetts; and with such success that, after expending thousands of millions of dollars, wasting property to the amount of other thousands of millions, and destroying lives to the extent of hundreds of thousands, we are now engaged in an effort at *reconstructing* the rickety edifice, taking no note of the fact that its permanent existence would be in opposition to all experience, as it would be certainly opposed to all the teachings of science."

Mr. Carey points out that the tendency of wants and legislation before the war was to increase the power and the weight of the *extreme North* and the *extreme South*, "while depopulating and weakening the centre." p. 10. Of course, now that the whole South has been overwhelmed by war and is crushed beneath the armed heel of military violence, the extreme North is left without its former rival and counterpoise, and it has otherwise vastly increased its predominance by the circumstances which attended the prosecution of the war.

There is still much of a sectional character as well as of partisan bitterness in the means of redress proposed by Mr. Carey for the evils which he condemns, and for the calamities which he apprehends. He plants himself on a Pennsylvania platform. He identifies geographical with political extremes; and claims moderation of view and liberality of sentiment for the region which lies between. He exaggerates in consequence the weight of his own State in the great combination of States; and he regards his own views as the exposition of the policy of his State. Yet, since the inauguration of the war, Pennsylvania has acted with the extremists of New England, and has been in the hands of the Radicals. His declarations must, therefore, be received with much salt; but so construed, there is much truth and more suggestion in them. Pennsylvania is to him not simply from its position the keystone of the grand-arch, but from its habitual policy. "As Pennsylvania has gone, so has always gone the Union. She does now go for abolition of monopolies, Northern, Eastern, and British, and it may be well for our Republican friends of the trading States to know that the days of their existence have been already counted, and have been found to be very few in number." Letter XIII, p. 69.

We must say that this utterance does not encourage our hopes of an early and wholesome Reconstruction of this Union; for at present, not Mr. Carey, but Mr. Thad. Stevens, Gov. Curtin, Gov. Geary, and Senator Cameron, to whom should perhaps be added Col. Forney, appear to represent Pennsylvania policy.

But, waiving these and similar inaccuracies of conception and statement, there is much that is encouraging and instructive in Mr. Carey's speculations. However erroneous may be his estimate of the present character of Pennsylvania influence, it may be a fair exhibition of its prospective policy when the time shall come that the resources of the great mountain region which he assimilates in interests and capabilities have been developed. That region extends from the highlands of New York to the northern counties of Mississippi. It spreads over a wide and rich belt of country, and runs through eleven States, promising to become at some future time a bond of connection and amity between populations at present diverse, and States hitherto irreconcilably dissimilar. He enlarges upon the mineral, agricultural and other riches of this vast tract; recognizes in their prompt and energetic developement the first effectual means towards the renewal of concord and the reestablishment of general prosperity. But, while thus insisting upon the immediate importance of cherishing the resources of this vast mountain domain, he is not insensible to the advantages enjoyed by the lowlands on each side, and to the urgent need of developing their peculiar but scarcely recognized sources of wealth. He sees that the South may wrest the grain trade from the North-west; that Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama may outstrip Illinois, Ohio and Kentucky in the

production of pork; and that the manufacturing monopoly of New England may be overcome by the distinctive advantages possessed by several of the present military districts.

There is great force in the remark of Mr. Carey that the past course of trade has been to transport the rich soil of the South and of the West to London and Liverpool, in the form of cotton, tobacco, and breadstuffs. We can certainly acquiesce with him in the analogous conclusion that the present tendency is to transfer the soil of the same regions, in the same form, to the cotton mills and harbors of New England; and may admit the justice with which he insists upon the approximation of the raw material and the manufacture. Whatever may have been the case heretofore, the changed conditions of the country requires such a conjunction of interests as may unite in close proximity the agriculturist, the miner, the manufacturer, the merchant, the artisan, and the consumer. The desolation of Sicily, Tunis, Egypt, was due to the Roman demand for foreign corn; the exhaustion of the plains of Poland and of Southern Russia may ensue from a similar demand from Great Britain; and the same result from the wide severance of the producers of the raw material, the manufacturers, and the consumers in America. This is not simply a question of immediate economy, but of permanent prosperity; and even the economy is rendered very dubious by the expenses of the double transportation. Foregoing, however, the examination of this point, there is no doubt that Mr. Carey urges an indispensable prerequisite of political reconstruction, when he insists on the need of industrial expansion in the Southern States. Whatever tenacity there may be in the maintenance of his theories, whatever fanaticism may have entered into his political faith, the tenacity is right and leads to no bigotry when it demands the rehabilitation of Southern prosperity, and the connection of the South and West by railroads, as the best and most expeditious means of repairing the ravages and mitigating the bitternesses of the late war.

Mr. Carey adheres with the fervor of age to the theories which employed and dignified his younger days. But his doctrines are now applied to the protection and encouragement of industry, mining and agriculture, rather than to the protection of manufactures which are now established, and threatens a sectional tyranny. As we have never considered free trade to be an exclusive truth, applicable at all times and under all circumstances, we cannot complain very strenuously of the recommendation of protection in such mode and degree as may be dictated by peculiar contingencies. All the doctrines of politics and political economy are conditional and transitory. Their truth rests upon expediency, upon their adaptation to present necessities, and to the contemporaneous relations of the communities of the world. We may agree with Mr. Carey that Free Trade is essential to Great Britain, but ruinous to States which have not equal advan-

tages in competition with her. We may admit that protection is required to build up the manufactures, and to preserve the commercial and political independence of a young and growing nation. But we are not thus compelled to affirm the universal scientific truth of either free trade or protection; nor do our admissions necessitate the acceptance of Mr. Carey's protective system, when we agree with him in desiring the harmonious conjunction of all industries and all interests in the same neighborhood.

While the political equilibrium between the different sections of the Union remained undisturbed—while conciliation and good will prevailed in the general government and in the intercourse between all the States—it was well for each region to pursue those avocations for which it was best adapted by soil, climate, situation, social organization and hereditary aptitude. The West might raise bread and meat for the Cotton States; the South might produce cotton, and tobacco, and rice for Northern use and exportation; the North might appropriate the manufactures, the commerce and the general trade of the whole country. When all prospered and all were satisfied, there was no need of an curious calculation for the sake of discovering what avocation brought the largest profits, what section derived the amplest returns from the diversified operations of the country. But when jealousy and heart-burning, and political rivalry, took the place of good feeling, and provoked sectional discord, such an inquiry was inevitable. And now that the results of war have overthrown the social system of the South, crushed its liberties, destroyed the political influence necessary for its defence, reduced its inhabitants to destitution, incapacitated it for the pursuit of its former industry and deprived it of its peculiar products, other considerations than those of political economy compel it to change its policy with the change of its requirements, and of its institutions. Its especial want, now, is an enlarged population, which can be invited and maintained only by the diversification of employments. It must assimilate its interests to those of other sections, in order to secure support and favor. This can be done only by the assimilation of its pursuits to theirs. It must enlarge the means of subsistence and the forms of employment. It must practice small economies, which were previously unthought of, because unnecessary. It must create anew its capitals—must vary their form and must extend their amount, in consequence of the competition of vast capitals elsewhere accumulated, and mainly augmented by the very incidents and consequences of that war by which it has been crippled and impoverished. All of these considerations (and they might be indefinitely multiplied) furnish so many arguments for an entire change of procedure, and for the adoption of many arrangements which were previously undesirable. The South is compelled to change alike its modes of life and its line of action in the face of manifold difficulties, fearful

competition and undisguised hostility. It has on its side only brave hearts, a bright sun, a fertile soil and vast deposits of mineral wealth. Its chief assurance of future prosperity must rest upon the knowledge that its ample resources are wholly undeveloped, and are almost untouched. The past is a sad and sacred memory—the future is all before it. The prospective fortunes of a country depend less upon its present accumulations than upon the extent of its unexhausted capabilities. In the latter respect, the Southern States are more highly favored than almost any other region under the sun. But to profit by such auguries, we must increase our population, enlarge our industries, vary our pursuits, economize our processes, and retain our profits as much as possible at home. With increase of population will come increase of political security; with augmentation of means will come increase of power and increasing celerity of advancement. With returning prosperity will return peace, happiness, contentment, and the other blessings which are denied to us in our present condition.

There are great obstacles to be overcome—and in many parts of this country they can be conquered only gradually and very slowly—in some districts they may prove insurmountable. The rice lands may be relegated to their former rank wildness, and again become pestilential swamps. The sugar plantations of the Lower Mississippi may require more than a generation to be reclaimed. But the greater part of the Southern country may be rapidly restored as soon as order and tranquility have been established. We are disposed, perhaps by our sanguine hopes, to participate in Mr. Carey's belief that "the day is at hand when emigration to the South and South-west must take the place now occupied by emigration to the West; and when power is to pass from the poor soils of the North-east to those richer ones which now offer themselves in such vast abundance in the Centre, the South, and the South-west."

We believe that the great central and Western States will soon gravitate towards the Southern in consequence of a general community of interest, and the recognition that their subordination to New England is more disastrous to them than any real or imaginary dependence upon the Cotton States ever was or could be. (v. 26.)

But among the chief difficulties to be overcome before such a rehabilitation of the South is practicable, one of the greatest is the retention of ancient principles of action, and of recently embittered prejudices. Allies are not made by the perpetuation of hostilities; friends are not obtained by passionate denunciations; new systems are not established by the encouragement of antiquated opinions. It might be expedient to enforce the necessity cutting up the immense Southern plantations and farms into all tracts; but for this there is not space; and the necessity of doing is drawing upon the reluctant minds of the Southern people.

A much more serious obstacle to the renovation of prosperity, because much less likely to be speedily removed, is the concentration of capital in New York and New England, and the singularly disproportionate distribution of the national currency which gives all financial advantages to the North-eastern States, and compels all other sections, and especially the impoverished South, to pay usurious interest as tribute for scant accommodation to Northern capitalists and their Southern agencies. This point, however, is too intricate and recondite to be introduced at the close of these remarks. It is very fully and very ably discussed by Mr. Carey in the latter part of his pamphlet, with a minuteness of knowledge and an accuracy of detail, which we have no means of imitating at a distance from the great centres of financial operations. We can only observe that the stagnation of all enterprises at the South, the utter dilapidation of fortunes subsequent to the war, the embarrassment of all classes, the multiplication of bankruptcies, the unalterable and all-pervading stringency of the times, the hopelessness of the future, and the impediments to the revival of industry, are attributable to this concentration of capital in the East, as much as to any other cause. This is so largely due to political influences that it is impossible to suggest any effectual remedy until there is a change of political action. That change the Southern people cannot effectuate or expedite; but the Great West is suffering from the same disproportionate distribution of the currency, and it may compel a change of policy by which the disfranchised States may be relieved. Meanwhile, in patience and in hope, we must persevere in quietly and energetically doing everything permitted by our powers and means to invite that restoration of material welfare which must precede any available reconstruction, and which can alone render us solicitous for such reconstruction.

In dismissing Mr. Carey's able pamphlet, which we have noticed very cursorily, we must express our wish that intelligent and dispassionate men, in the dominant section of the country, would favor the Southern people, not with advice, which is usually treacherous dictation, but with their estimate of the true policy to be pursued in restoring the industry of the South, and in reconstructing the government of the Union. From such essays, if ably composed, much that is valuable in the way of suggestion may be obtained, and the means would be afforded for such conjectures of the future as might enlighten, guide or confirm our action. Situated as we are, in these unhappy military districts, there is no one of whom we can ask with any confidence of a trustworthy answer—

"Watchman! what of the night?"

ART. III—GRADUAL INCREASE OF AFRICAN PEOPLE IN LOUISIANA.

From the time that the first African labor hands were introduced into Louisiana, we may trace the continual increase and importance of this part of our population upon the shores of our great Mississippi river. Unlike the Indian tribes, some of whom assisted the first colonial settlers in opening the forests and breaking the ground for field culture, but who, apparently not calculated for a steady and civil life, afterwards disappeared or melted away before the influx of the other races, the blacks have not only been civilized to a certain degree, and entered the white household in the capacity of inferior agents, but there has also been a continual increase in their numbers and the extension of their race coequal with that of the whites throughout all the Southern States. This distinctive feature in Louisiana history, as well as the other formerly slaveholding States of the Union, deserves to receive some further detail and elucidation. Whilst under the French domination, that is, up to the year 1763, the introduction of the Africans was especially licensed by royal authority. We perceive that under the Spanish colonial régime, this introduction was rather restricted, and if not altogether prohibited, yet greatly impeded by the colonial authorities. In the first place, Louisiana, having been annexed, as it were, to the island of Cuba, which had been created into colonial Captaincy General by a decree of the Spanish court, it followed that the highest jurisdiction for the united colony had its seat in the latter island, or its capital the city of Havana. From that place there came also mostly the orders for the new African hands, sparsely introduced into the new acquisition upon the Mississippi. But insomuch as the second-hand or improved slave laborers, were rather at exorbitant prices, being more or less civilized, or brought up to field culture by the Spanish colonists in the island of Cuba, this manner of supplying the Louisiana planters with new labor hands, was little to their liking. On the other side, it was considered also by the Castilian authorities more conducive to their interests to introduce free white laborers, than to increase the riches and capacities for independence of the colonial planters, who had exhibited then so little disposition of a loyal adherence to the Spanish crown. Under these mutual dispositions, it seems that on one hand the planters declined receiving any Spanish raised Africans, and, on the other, the government of the island of Cuba was rather inclined to deprive the planters of any additional labor supply.

This being about the true position of affairs, after the advent of Spanish domination (1770), we shall perceive that by a clandestine commerce, favored under the British flag, which now had obtained the free navigation of the Mississippi, a number of raw and half taught Africans were introduced into the lower delta,

under the successive administrations of the Governors Unzaga (1770), Galvez (1776), and Miro (1786), until that of Governor Carondelet (in 1792). During all this long period, the traffic for the purchase of African labor hands was most active, as we have stated in the first place, under the protection of the British flag, who were in possession of all the coast of the left hand side of the Mississippi, from the Bayou Manchac up to the already considerable settlements at Natchez, and from thence as high as the Illinois and upper rivers, though then the actual settlers being mostly French and Canadian families, that species of merchandise was little in demand. But in the lower settlements and plantations, African field hands were much sought after, and the English traders from Jamaica realized great profits by this then universally approved branch of industry.

After the reconquest of the Floridas by Governor Galvez, and their final retransfer to the Spanish crown, the introduction of Africans became somewhat more difficult to the English, or rather we should now say the American traders, because posterior to the peace of Paris, in 1783, and the acknowledgment or recognizance of the independent States of America, the whole left hand shore on the Mississippi being claimed by these States, yet this district of country (Natchez, Yazoo, etc.), for a number of years continued under the temporary possession of the Spanish colonial authorities. It was only in 1795 that military possession was taken, by the United States, of this section of the Mississippi valley; and in this interval, the above named clandestine traffic had suffered more or less, according to the personal disposition of the Governors and subaltern authorities in the colony. When, however, under the mild administration of Governor Miro, it became the national policy of Spain to attract as many new colonists as possible to the delta settlement.

We may well conclude that the American merchants and planters, who had established themselves at New Orleans and in its vicinity, were especially favored with regard to the introduction of the African field laborers and domestic help. Hence, we see it stated that a number of Philadelphia commercial firms, then the great mercantile centre of the newly emancipated States, had taken the initiatory steps for establishing extensive mercantile concerns in Louisiana. One of these mercantile firms was the house of Benjamin Morgan & Co., who, in aftertimes, were the first to introduce stone pavements in our city, by making the experiment of laying stones, but from the upper river, at the flat-boat landing, opposite Tchoupitoulas street, and towards their warehouses, in Gravier and Magazine streets. Another firm was that of Case, Clark & Co., whose active partner in Louisiana was the wealthy Daniel Clark, much known in aftertimes on account of the extraordinary succession suit of his heirs, etc. There was also the house of John Jones & Co., whose head partner was the first American consul in Louisiana, commissioned under the adminis-

tration of the elder John Adams, President of the United States from 1796 to 1800. All these commercial firms and others, no doubt, by having obtained royal licenses or colonial permits from the Governors, managed to introduce and provide the planters with numbers of African labor hands, who arrived sometimes by very roundabout or circuitous ways, as we have been assured by old Louis Bringier, in later years State Surveyor of Louisiana, but who, in his younger years, had been employed by Daniel Clark in some of his mercantile transactions, from New Orleans to Vera Cruz, and in other Mexican Gulf localities.

When, however, the Baron Carondelet, in 1792, had taken the reins of the colony, and the very serious negro revolts in the West India Islands (St. Domingo) were cautioning the other provinces possessing colonies against this inflammable population, to be on their guard, the surveillance upon the introduction of these labor forces was somewhat resumed, and the traffic experienced, for a short while, a new interruption. At this particular period there happened, also, a short negro revolt upon the plantation of Julien Poydras, a rich planter of the Pointe Coupée settlement, whose absence, being upon a visit to the Northern States, may have contributed to the outbreak—a most rare and almost unaccountable circumstance in our Louisiana history. This revolt was, however, soon suppressed, and Julien Poydras proved, in after times, by the testamentary emancipation of his slaves, that he had had no reason to be dissatisfied with their general behavior.

ART. IV — PROGRESS OF AMALGAMATION.

That the question of black suffrage comprehends, necessarily, that of equal social station, by the African race in our country, requires, it seems to us, no further elucidation. But it may candidly be asked by some, "Why not accord them this equality?" Here, we do confess, we will lay aside everything that may in the least savor of prejudice, on account of color, or former slavery or servitude, in the sable race, and state the reasons, which we deem really important to the welfare of the whole of Southern society, in refusing them this social equality.

Often it has been demanded of us, why not accord them *les droits de l'homme*? that is to say, the rights of man, and which they interpret, of course, the legal right of intermarriage between black and white.

If we ascend to the first law-giver whom history has preserved us, Moses, of the chosen people, we will there find that he prohibited marriage between close blood relations. Why was this prohibition? Because the law-giver wanted the society founded upon a stable basis, that of the sacred family relations, thus continuing a healthy state in the whole structure of human society,

whilst the example of the surrounding heathen nations offered, by their promiscuous cohabitation, the condition of a continually perishing race of men.

Now, it is with Southern society as with the ancient Israelites: unless the sacred bonds of matrimony are held in full respect; unless, by law, both races are kept asunder, from commingling and degenerating, it will be impossible to found what must ever be the true basis of modern society, that is to say, the groundwork of family relations. Without this holy foundation, let the material progress of a nation be ever so great, the canker-worm of dissolution is gnawing at its very vitals; and hence we oppose with all our might the introduction into our Southern legislation this initiatory step of social equality.

It is not a pure matter of taste, this changing of one's family condition, but it is the most serious consideration of Southern statesmen and law-givers to provide against the vicious proclivities of mankind, always given to deteriorate, not to improve, the social condition. Whilst legally keeping distinct both races, the black and the white, both may progress in perfecting their status, morally, intellectually and physically; and whilst thus the law will have its due influence and force, the *infractions* of the rule only serve to better elucidate the general beneficence of the legal barrier, just as the defence of appropriating our neighbors' goods does in no wise justify stealing or robbery.

Having thus stated our reasons for withholding from the two races the legal commingling, we shall now come to another chapter of this state of society in our very midst, and explain how it happens that here in New Orleans, particularly, such a strong interest has grown up to advocate a policy, that of bestowing social as well as political equality upon this class of our free-born colored population, which elsewhere may not be in such a forward state of expectation. To explain properly the condition of things in this respect, we must recur to the life of the first colonists who established the country.

During the French dominion, and even long after, during the Spanish possession of Louisiana, New Orleans was peopled mostly by transient persons, who, arriving from the mother country, never intended to stay in the colony beyond a period in which they might make and collect what was called a fortune, and with this return to the parent country. Such were all the officers and employees of the administrations, the officers in the army and navy; most of the adventurers and merchants came out to try their good luck, etc., etc. None of these ever thought of forming a permanent settlement in the country, and hence they would mostly indulge in what was called *placing*, or temporary family engagements, or semi-marriage with females of the colored race. Hence dates the origin of most of the wealthy colored population in our midst. They are more or less industrious and respectable, but their origin and wealth dates back to the abnormal condition

of their ancestors, the white European or other colonists in the times before the American advent.

When this latter took place, a new phase necessarily arose in our society; these clandestine, half marriages between the white and colored persons were looked upon as more or less disreputable, and a great change, in the course of time, was brought about, most of the very wealthiest of the colored people removing to Europe or the North, and there forming family connexions according to their taste and estimation. Here in New Orleans, as society became more and more sensitive upon this point, people began to scrutinize all such family relations, and although what were called marriages of *conscience* still continued, yet even the colored population would watch with vigilance the observance of strict family fidelity. This state of things coming down to our own days, a new problem presents itself, upon the solution of which they (the colored people) insist, that is to say, they now claim full legal competence to have the marriages between the two races declared binding and of full judicial force.

This being the actual position of affairs, it will at once strike the reader that, with us in New Orleans, and generally in Louisiana, the question of black suffrage embraces quite another field than the mere depositing in the ballot-box a bit of paper for such or such a candidate. Now, are people generally ready for the admission of the colored persons into their family circle by the sacred rites of marriage? that is the question. Is the country prepared to admit what the colored race demand, to-wit: that no distinction shall be made between a marriage contracted among themselves or between the two races? That is to say, must the father of a white family acknowledge the validity of a marriage contracted between his son and a pitch-black Ethiopian, and have his new daughter-in-law introduced among the members of his white household, *volens volens*, and entitled to all the usual family relations? Will they be entitled to assist at all the family meetings, family reunions family festivities, etc., etc.? Shall they have power to open family vaults in the graveyards, order the white ancestors' bones to be disinterred and removed elsewhere, and their own transferred into these hitherto held sacred white family sepulchres?

These and many other questions follow in the train of according them (the colored people) social and family equality, and with less they never will be satisfied, now that the era of an unlimited field of equality has been opened to them.

We could multiply the seemingly extraordinary positions in which the whole Southern society would be involved, and the complete upsetting of our whole code of laws with regard to family concerns, etc., should such an upheaval ever take place in our very midst; but we opine, as the Anglo Saxon race has not utterly repudiated its pretensions to common sense and sound policy, there need be no danger of such doctrines of communal

equality spreading beyond the limits of a few scattered writers or publicists. However, we must keep in mind that modern society has an awful squinting towards these dissolving principles, and in some respects we seem again, as it were, approaching a state of paganism or heathenism, which existed before the advent of Christ, and which was one of the many causes that rendered *then* the great reform in society necessary and successful. Now, however, society seems, as it were, gradually retrograding or falling back into this condition of promiscuity; and therefore our law-givers and state men cannot be too watchful over these attempts at renovations of an exploded communistic system.

C. D.

ART. V—THE AGE OF SHAM.

The word *sham*, which a learned legicographer declares to be "not elegant," presents itself as the most expressive and appropriate title for the age in which we live. We are growing careless and indifferent to the truthful and real, and yielding ourselves up to the unsound and meretricious. "All that glitters is not gold," was never more painfully evidenced in every walk of life and every phase of society than now. It is the motto defiantly flaunted on the banners of the present day and generation, and boldly worn emblazoned on the curious escutcheon of the times. In the folds of fashion's robe, by the hearthstone of home, in the aisles of public worship, in commerce, in politics, at the feasts of Belshazzar, and, alas! sometimes even at the simple supper of our Lord, we behold the false glitter, the pale mockery of the pure gold of truth, honor and religion. We have set up for ourselves a goddess of varnished clay, whose crown is of false jewels, whose sceptre is deceit and whose throne is a nest of sleeping vipers. Over all hangs the tinsel mantle which, with its flimsy sheen, blinds our eyes to all deformities; and we bow down at the shrine of Display, while the virus of her poisoned tongue, like the hiss of the serpent in the ears of Eve, blights all our Eden. We listen unaware.

Among the first to proclaim the dominion of power in the hands of this reckless ruler was Shoddy. Just as a vile character, by some social legerdemain, gains admission into circles of real rank and merit, and at last acquires a certain degree of respectability by mingling with respectable people, so Shoddy, little by little, with the assistance of skill and adroit mechanism, introduced its threadbare gentility among the pure staple, until it became so intimately interwoven therewith that it readily passed for the real article. Although its existence is well known, and its value correctly estimated, so indifferent are we to its use that it has become an acknowledged portion of woollen manufactures, and few of us leave our tailors' hands without bearing on our persons in the

shape of the shiny new suit, the hand and seal of Shoddy, the Grand Duke of Shams! It has given a distinctive title to certain classes of persons, made up of elements as doubtful of origin, as mixed and as dependent upon appearances as itself. While they, however, are as yet excluded from the ranks of old-familism and other pegs and hooks on which are hung claims to aristocracy, the goods from which these classes are derisively designated, is as much worn by Monsieur Bullion-Stocks-Millionaire as by humble John Four-dollars-per-day. It wears badly; why should it not, when the principal percentage of material has been already once worn out? But it *looks* well, it passes for real; and this is enough, since what a thing *seems* to be, not what it really is, is the criterion by which it is judged.

In the finer classes of goods, Mungo asserts itself. Much the same thing, in fact, but another name for shoddy, it belongs to the more expensive styles of woolen manufactures; as it is capable, from its better quality, of being mixed with finer staples. The finest black cloths in market are said to contain a large proportion of it. The dandy sports it, it robs the priest in his pulpit, and who shall say whence comes the material for the bridegroom's wedding garment? Does he obtain them, as he supposes, from legitimate sources, pure and unadulterated, or are they gathered together from the sullied precincts of pawn-brokers' shops, from tatters which have swung from the begrimed shoulders of poverty and the reeking form of debauchery; or are they carefully selected from the assorted treasures of the rag-picker's sack? Satinet contains a large per cent of mungo, and I venture to say that many under-garments, composed of cotton and wool and woolen hosiery, are by no means guiltless of a taint of this most questionable material. Were the occupants of brown stone mansions alone the buyers and wearers of shoddy, it might matter less, perhaps. If their refined nostrils sniff nothing repulsive in the conglomeration of material, their use of it is nobody's business, and might be set down as a mere indulgence of eccentric tastes. Unfortunately, however, their use of it encourages its manufacture, and cottage and cabin, which must, also, buy coats and trowsers, are the sufferers. They find, to their unutterable disappointment, that the long-saved shillings have been expended for a Sunday garment that grows rapidly rusty, soon is threadbare, and at last hangs upon the wearer a dilapidated proof of the cheats and trickery of the age.

Aside from this prime minister in the shining courts of sham, are many other tricks of trade which, if not quite so base, are at least blood relations to this tatterdemalion leader. In fact, so great is the mania for counterfeits, they are adopted in many instances when it would seem from the use of the pure material would accrue infinitely more advantage to the manufacturers. For instance, even at the recent high prices of cotton, within the last few years it has been a rare thing to find the product of the

blue-eyed flax fields unmixed with the snowy locks of its pale-faced cousin of the cotton patch. Silk goods are also often mixed with dyed cotton material; and as for groceries, who shall say how much sand or plaster of paris is mixed with our sugar, how much sawdust with our ginger, and let our milkmen inform us how much milk we get in the water we buy of them! A statistician once declared to me there was more Madeira wine consumed in this country in one year than that island could produce in three. Germany, it is said, exports a wine which contains not one drop of grape juice, and we sip and smile over a sparkling mixture of vile ingredients for which we pay a real price and are therefore unwilling to believe a real sham. We swallow claret under the delusion that it is the pure juice of the grape, while our stomachs shrivel with the alum it contains, and our complexions absorb its logwood. We make a decoction of rye, or sweet potatoes, or roasted walnuts, and call it coffee; or we buy ground coffee, as we suppose, and drink chickory; while chickory itself, mean as it is, has now its imitation made, so the *Journal of Chemistry* informs us, "of oak bark, of old coffee grounds, of finely-sifted coal ashes, or from the sawdust of mahogany and black walnut woods, as well as iron black and ground horse leathers!" Mocha coffee itself, that delicious beverage whose rich aroma we praise and whose flavor we prize, is, we are assured upon the authority of Professor Blot, but the smaller grains of Maricabo, Java and Rio, carefully separated from the larger berries and sold to deluded purchasers who, are willing to pay an extra price for a really "choice article."

With regard to the ladies, it is difficult to decide in their "make up" what is sham and what is real, so skilfully does fashion mould them into whatever form her capricious fancy may dictate. The lady whose circumference in the reign of large hoops amazed us, has now, during the prevailing epidemic of gored skirts, become so attenuated that one is led to suppose nothing short of a galloping consumption could have produced such a rapid falling off. What exact proportion the gentler sex bear to the shams of the day, it would by no means be easy to tell; but taking the head alone as an evidence, we may conclude it to be a very material one. What with curls, and braids, and frisettes and waterfalls; rats, mice, cataracts and chignons, we are told the demand for human hair so far exceeds the supply, that France has undertaken to make up the deficiency by manufacturing false hair out of the inner fibre of the bark of a certain tree. The weight and heat of all extra hirsute adornments are ruinous to the health of the natural hair, "*fatigue*" it as your scientific knight of the razor and strop will assure you, and weaken it to such a degree, it loses the power to cling to its native soil, and so falls out and becomes thin, or leaves the scalp unsheltered. When fashion changes, as she is sure to do, and women are reduced to their own natural supply of hair, alas! we fear should the children

take to crying, "Go up, thou baldhead," to all bereft of crinal developments, there would not be bears enough in the world to eat up all the saucy little sinners. When that day comes, however, doubtless the accommodating goddess, Fashion, who sees the world following ever at her antic heels, will decree that it is a lovely thing in the sight of man for woman, if we may be allowed a sailors' phrase, to scud along under bare poles; and perchance their pates will then be as carefully denuded of every intrusive hair as now they are heaped up and deformed by masses of foreign locks at so much per ounce. As we inspect the piled-up craniums of the present day, what a consolation lies in the reflection that the strength of women is not in their hair; otherwise what hosts of female Sampsons would we daily encounter! It is a costly practice, this extravagant adorning of women's heads till it seems the slender necks could scarce support the burden, and the sums expended in supplying one fashionable lady with false hair sufficient for her purpose, for one year, would comfortably shoe John Rogers' whole family for the same length of time, the one at the breast included. As regards the gold and diamond dust (so called), now so much in vogue for sprinkling the hair, it is as false as the locks themselves; the gold being the chippings of the tawdriest tinsel, and the diamond dust merely powdered gypsum. The custom itself has the rather doubtful merit of antiquity. The story runneth thus: When King Solomon was about fifty years old, he fell into rather wild ways, and became a decidedly fast young man. He kept a great number of chariots, paid great attention to the ladies, and kept a splendid lot of two-forty nags, which he drove upon causeways of black stone, which we presume nearly equalled our own shell roads. The ancient chronicler also assures us that the jockeys who rode these horses were selected and cared for with as much zeal as the animals themselves. They were young men in the flower of their youth, and wore garments of Tyrian purple. They had, moreover, luxuriant hair, which floated loose and very long over their shoulders. They had, furthermore, "*dust of gold every day sprinkled on their hair, so that their heads sparkled with the reflection of the sunbeams from the gold.*" As this was in the days when Solomon "made silver as plentiful in the streets of Jerusalem as stones," and so multiplied cedar trees in the plains of Judea that they were like the "multiplied common sycamore tree," it is to be supposed that these favored young gentlemen powdered their locks with the genuine article, and did not resort to shams.

With regard to ornament, it is pitiful to see to what base imitations fashion lends herself, loading neck and arms with artificial gems—cheap imitations of coral, mock mosaics and dubious diamonds. They are worn with a shameless effrontery which at least is real; and the practice has become so universal, one turns disgusted from these sickening types of vanity to seek the "beauty unadorned," which becomes all the more precious from contrast.

These impostures cannot be justified on the plea of economy, for economy would do without them altogether; and it is a shame to yoke so noble a virtue to so vile a carcass as that of hollow-hearted display.

In all the mad whirl of frivolity, and the almost insane desire for mere show, there apparently exists a corresponding indifference to that which does not show. Not upon the softer sex alone can rest the imputation of dishonesty in ornamentation and trickery of attire; for the lords of creation themselves cannot possibly deny the soft impeachment. For proof of this, step into any of our first-class furnishing stores for gentlemen. You will see false wristbands, with sleeve-buttons of sham gold set with sham stones. You will see dickeys, or false shirt-bosoms, of fine linen and immaculate purity, all prepared to fasten on over any defiled shirt front which may have come in contact with dust, tobacco juice, misguided ink drops, or any of the ills that such bosoms are heir to. As to paper collars, they are to be had *ad libitum*, of every imaginable size and pattern. It is claimed that all these are modern improvements, which materially reduce the washerwoman's bill, and some there are who declare them to be excellent things on the score of neatness. Surely, it cannot be the neatness of real refinement, and honest cleanliness washes her hands of the whole affair, and resents the acceptance of these spurious representatives of her own pure comeliness. There are those, even, who contend that soiled wristbands and collars are the signs manual of a garment which requires to come in contact with a certain vulgar solution known as soap-suds. These fine-spun theorists, however, probably knew little of the real state of the case, and having formed their own principles on the good old copy-book apothegm that "cleanliness is akin to godliness," their delicate olfactories take umbrage at trifles, and, besides, taking an upward tendency at the advice "assume a virtue if you have it not," find in odors imperceptible to others "an offense that smells to heaven."

As an offset to the false hair of woman, behold the dyed locks of man. The silver crown of age, that venerable and honored badge which, coupled with a life of honest virtue, awakens in the heart, for the humblest wearer, emotions of the most profound reverence and respect, has become almost extinct. We may soon allude to gray hair as we do to the dodo and the mastodon and other things that were, but will be no more forever. Above the furrowed forehead of sixty, nowadays, rises a criniferous scalp, whose carefully manipulated locks would do honor to a youth of twenty. Methuselah tricked out in the locks of Absalom. Dyeing the hair, however, appears to be by no means a new thing under the sun. Josephus informs us that among the accusations brought against King Herod by Alexander, his son, when the latter was conspiring for the throne, was the charge that the King dyed his hair black, "in order to cover his age and conceal

"that which would discover how old he was." Even in those days, we are led to suppose it was a custom "more honored in the breach than the observance," and calculated to bring ridicule upon those adopting it. Among Bible heroes generally, whitened locks seem to have been deemed naught of which to be ashamed; but are alluded to with a touching degree of dignity and gentle pathos. Jacob, in his appeal to his sons not to take Benjamin back with them to Egypt, says, "If mischief befall him by the way in which ye go, then shall ye bring down my gray hairs with sorrow to the grave." Samuel telleth "unto all Israel," upon the renewal of the kingdom of Saul, "I am old and gray-headed, and I have walked before you from my childhood unto this day," thus, as it were, making his white hair which had grown gray in all the years he had walked before them from his childhood, appeal to their tenderness and veneration. Moreover, in the old biblical code, we are particularly commanded to "rise up before the hoary head and honor the face of the old man," but in these days, when we fain would "honor the face of the old man," the raven locks he sports defies our reverence and warns us 'twould be more acceptable to present him to a partner for the next hop waltz.

However innocent in themselves may be the gilts and veneers, the mockeries and deceits, and all the venial pomps and vanities of the present day, their influence is certainly most pernicious. Human nature is proverbially weak, and as the taste becomes depraved to the use of false adornments and sham decorations, the heart grows less and less afraid of untruths of a different character. That nature which boldly sports a lie in apparel, and parades the flimsey cheat as a genuine article, gradually ceases to shrink from the contaminations of deceit, if it does not experience an actual pleasure in its triumph; and the attained soul suddenly plumes itself upon the sullied pinions of falsehood, and soars away as calmly over the bottomless pit of the false, as it once stood beside the still deep wells of truth. We see the venom spreading everywhere—friendships—affections of a tenderer nature, the strong and mighty ties of common brotherhood, the seal of shame is there, "the trail of the serpent is over them all." It has even crept into the ranks of childhood. We have no more real children, they are bedecked, begewgawed bits of fashionable affectation—dressed expensively, fed on mock nutriment—refreshed with bad wine, allowed to go out when they ought to go to bed; and permitted to lie in bed when its time to get up, they are, alas, the concentrated quintessence of sham. Have we sham statesmen? Let the daily records at Washington, as now seen by the eyes of a Republic bound half in the shackles of arrogance, and half in the fetters of shame, reply. Have we a sham government? Let the South, with her neck beneath the barbarous heel of oppression, from the thresholds of her impoverished homes, respond. Alas! we have sham idols, sham heroes, sham politi-

cians, sham scholars, and sham schools. Has not education become a shallow pool, in which we see the empty smattering of all things forming the muddy foundation wherein we seek in vain for one honest pebble of knowledge? Do not half the members of schools study to recite, and not to retain, what they study? Are not teachers who would fain be true, constantly thwarted and defied by tricky pupils, who are content with the untrue? Alas and alas! We seek no more for the royal and enduring purple of Tyre, but content ourselves with its base and fleeting imitation. Could but some honest and earnest Savonerella rise to confront the false and fictitious practices of the present, how would his soul revolt from its errors, and how fearfully would his zeal lay bare its shallow pretences, its hollow mockeries, its greeds, its guilt, its tinkling brass and sounding cymbals. How would he rear his pyramid of vanities until it rose Olympus high, and the destroying flames, kindled by his "holy horror" and aversion, could feed their growing hunger to repletion with the flimsy follies of the age of sham.

NEW ORLEANS, MAY, 1868.

ART. VI—RAILROAD POLICY FOR THE SOUTH.

As a deduction from the importance of material development, it is our duty to discuss one of its most important departments. It is that of internal commerce. The adoption of railroad transportation has been a new dispensation for the South, separated from market by long intervals, and cut off from intercourse with the centres of intelligence and business, by the innavigability of Southern rivers, during much of the year; the Southern planter or farmer was peculiarly in the power of speculation. He sold on the tail of every market, and paid a larger proportion of his crop money to the intermediate jobber and factor, than most other men who cultivate the earth. The railroad delivered him from much of this exaction and dependence. With a capacity to put his cotton in market at any season, the Southern planter can now realize upon his crop at any place. His bill of lading and policy of insurance, accompanied by his sample, are certificates of value which will command a cash advance in any market of the civilized world. Cotton, with the capacity for immediate delivery, becomes cash. The same facilities of intercourse with the world markets enables the planter to procure, under all the advantages of commercial competition, whatever article he may need, in exchange. The Southern planter thus sells for better prices, and with larger net results, and purchases in cheaper markets whatever he may need. The railroad, then, is a new dispensation for the South.

But, with most other God given blessings, the railroad has been impeded in its usefulness by human selfishness. The lightning which God vouchsafed to Franklin and Morse, for the use of mankind, has fallen in monopoly to Cyrus Field and Simonton; they retail this mighty engine of civilization to those who are able to pay the best price. In like manner Southern railroads have fallen into hands which direct them, rather for local or individual, than public advantage. We employ the term individual, as the roads are not worked for the benefit even of the corporations which built them. In the first place, our roads are in great part managed by men who are not qualified by education or nature. Presidents are appointed according to their politics; directors for the same reason, and sometimes because of their necessities, and subordinate officers for the merit of being related by blood or marriage to the directory. We do not like to say so, but it is an indisputable fact. In the want of honorable and lucrative employment for many of our citizens, they are provided for by assigning to them places in the various public and private corporations of the country. Some of the consequences of this unwise charity we shall expose in our railroad strictures. The first consequence is, that an administration constituted on the principle stated wishes to do as little as possible. It prefers to be a close corporation—inaccessible to public complaint. Such an administration probably has a road seventy-five miles long. This will pay all the salaries and keep the road running. Such an administration we may suppose the Boston and Worcester railroad, which did not add one burden car to its equipage in twenty years. The administration of this short road does not care to connect with any other road. In fact, it has an hostility to such connections. So it requires all connecting roads to deliver in good order, and with all formalities, all freights consigned to this seventy-five mile road. This involves a trouble and expense of drayage and delivery, with the verifications and manifesting of freights at each terminus. Of course there must be a local agency employed to conduct this through business. Thus we have seen small Southern towns come in between two railroads like the chair between the end of two rails. There was a portage through this town. Passengers were waked up. Baggage wagons and hacks rendered the traveler blasphemous and insane with their wrangling and dishonesty. Freights were broken open and left over. The directory kept very still under the humane idea that the passenger was the legitimate prey of these Arabs of the portage, and they drink gratuitous grog with the landlord, enriched with the spoils of the disappointed traveler. At this point commenced the express system. Seeing that the sectional railroads would not make the connection for light merchandise, the express companies proposed to do this for the roads. So they hired cars to run on fast time, paid the road as much, or more, than could have been obtained from the shippers of these

goods, put in express wagons, at the break of gauge, and made through freights. This relieved the directory of all responsibility, and of a great deal of trouble. It, in effect, sub-let the public to the express company. The difference to the public was very important. The road could legally ask no more than its chartered rates. The express company could collect any private contract it might make. It was a violation of faith to hire the public out in that manner.

It was a most unwise act on the part of the railroad company. The company had built the road; it maintained the road; if an accident occurred to the road, the company paid its repairing. Why, then, should the railroad company have given the express company the right to charge a premium on the service which it had performed? Only because the directory did not know or care for the duties confided to them. They "threw off" the public which had contracted with them to transport their persons and effects. The public had given the company a monopoly of this transportation in consideration of performing it in an adequate manner and at reasonable rates. In return, the company sold the public to the express companies. As a consequence, however, of this expensive system of providing for persons who could not provide for themselves, these scrap railroads came to trouble.

We do not ignore the effects of the war in aiding to break down these roads. At the close of the war, they were greatly embarrassed with increase of interest, floating debt and the necessity of repairs. This rendered necessary another set of agents to redeem the promises of the roads. Gentlemen were employed to go wherever there was money, and wheedle "the ninnies clear out of their guineas." They were chosen generally because of their political incidents or antecedents, but generally having heard that a committee were to go abroad at the expense of the railroad, and not having seen the North since before the war, they procured, with the usual indirection, the agency. It is incredible how many ex-Governors and statesmen of a former régime, were very intimate with Presidents Buchanan, Fillmore or Seward, have been exported on this object since the war. They have been generally disappointed, except as to the personal satisfaction of the excursion. Political influence, loyal protestations, financial management, "could not all redeem the ruined mansion from its fall." Creditors grew tired of postponement; they proceeded on coupon demands, obtained process, and sold out several of these roads, and broke up some of the asylums most interesting to our political and personal sympathies. The public began to see the necessity of putting these involved roads in liquidation. The income of the road would pay its expenses. It was built and could not stop. What did it matter to the public who owned it? Grant that the private stockholders lost by reduction of its market value. Were there not other investments just as meritorious? Why was the public bound to pay this

back debt? There was no honorable obligation to do so. The unfeeling manner in which the corporations had sold the public to the express companies, with many other sharp exactions, had extinguished any public sympathy for these debtors. The creditors were in fact citizens of other States, and the public felt no especial anxiety to repay them the losses of war. The loss of States and cities as stockholders will be more than made good by reducing freights and fares to the citizens.

From these causes, the efforts of the directories to keep themselves in office by borrowing money to pay the back debts of the railroads have in many instances failed, and the roads have gone into liquidation, or passed into hands able to hold and improve them.

The economy of consolidation is very obvious. In the first place, the rolling stock can be worked to more advantage when owned and governed in quantity than when of limited amount. Then the machine shops can be on a larger and more complete scale. The cost of officers will be greatly reduced, when a single directory will control one thousand miles of road, instead of committing the same business to ten separate administrations, each having a section of one hundred miles. There are many instances of successful consolidation. The Pennsylvania Central combines some five different roads between Philadelphia and Chicago, a running distance of about 850 miles. The Atlantic and Great Western Railroad and branches are consolidated under a single administration. It combines about 450 miles. Three Virginia railroads are combined between Norfolk and the Tennessee line. But one of the most important and extensive consolidations recently made is that by which the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad comprehends about eight different corporations and 1380 miles of road under a single management. This economy of time of working companies is so obvious that it may be expected to become universal.

There is another reason why Southern roads should be consolidated. The competition for the travel and transportation coastwise, by the river and by the Western railroads, renders an improvement in time upon the direct routes between the North and South indispensable. The close connections, silver palace sleeping cars and superior time made on the Northern and Western roads, renders them very formidable rivals of the routes through Tennessee or the Carolinas. This will allow no compromise with old ideas or with local interests. The road companies along the coast have recently effected an arrangement by which they have consolidated the use of their roads as to through trade and travel. Passengers now travel from the Potomac to the Roanoke without a change of cars. The same arrangement is pervading the whole line of coastwise and Gulf State roads through Georgia and Alabama. The New Orleans, Jackson and Great Northern Railroad has effected a similar arrangement in

the direction of Louisville and Memphis. The advantages of the system are so obvious both to the stockholders and to the public, that we may soon expect to see roads connected and worked on through schedule throughout the whole South.

ART. VII—RECLAMATION OF THE OVERFLOWED LANDS IN LOUISIANA, MISSISSIPPI, ARKANSAS AND ALABAMA, BY A SYSTEM OF CANALS.

SABINE AND NEOSHO ON THE WEST, CONNECTING THE WATERS OF THE MISSOURI WITH THE GULF OF MEXICO, THROUGH SABINE BAY; YAZOO, BIG BLACK, AND PEARL RIVER CANAL, IN MISSISSIPPI; WILLSOULLY CANAL, CONNECTING THE WATER OF THE TENNESSEE RIVER WITH THE ALABAMA ON THE EAST; BAYOU MANCHAC AND LAKE PONCHARTRAIN CANAL AND LAKE BORGNE AND MISSISSIPPI RIVER CANAL, ON THE SOUTH; WITH OTHER OUTLETS IN THE SOUTH-WEST.

The rapid and vast increase of the internal commerce of the United States, with its stimulating effect on our increasing agricultural resources of our country, must arouse the commercial energy to keep pace with its vast développements. Our large rivers and navigable streams, canals, railroads, the great highways of internal commerce, are now taxed far beyond their capacity to accommodate the wants of an industrial and commercial people, while our government and people are busy extending her railroads in the frozen and bleak parts of our country, almost unfit for the abode of man. The most beautiful and salubrious portion of the continent is almost neglected.

Trade and communication is the life of the nation. We must grasp the rich commerce of China and Asia, by a grand system of railroads to the Pacific coast. The Southern Pacific railroad through Texas will prove the only practical line, while the extreme Northern lines will become a burden on account of the extreme ice and snow. God grant they may all be a success. Let our people and government be up and doing. Our internal commerce demands our best energies. When all our vast railroads, canals, and telegraph lines are completed, and rivers improved, with our thousands of steam horses, steam and canal boats, moving every second in the day, who can calculate the immense extension which our internal trade will assume, and what will be the result in regard to the price of all the comforts of life. Railroads, canals, and steam navigation has already done wonders in reducing the price of breadstuffs in our country, and it will undergo greater changes when we shall complete our vast system of internal improvements.

The distant States of California and Oregon have become the greatest wheat growing States, according to population, in the

Union. Commerce is not prepared to transport her surplus of wheat. The great State of Texas, in the north-western part, on Red River, is the greatest wheat and grain growing country in the south-west. Commerce is not prepared to render her any assistance in bringing her products to market. The great Sabine and Neesho canal will be to her what the Mississippi river is to Illinois and Missouri, her great centre of trade. West of this great canal, is the greatest wheat and grain growing country in the United States, and it will produce the most powerful influence upon the price of provisions in America.

The time is near at hand when Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois will hardly be able to produce bread for their own people.

In improving rivers, canals, and building railroads, we have already surpassed all the nations of the earth; creating a system of internal improvements which facilitates the transportation of mineral and agricultural products at extremely low rates. With all our great progress in internal improvements, we have a vast and important work before us when we look over our country and see the millions and millions of acres of fertile lands that are far away from any of the highways of trade. We feel it is the duty of the government, and the people, that are so blessed with these channels of commerce, to extend their railroads and canals to those needy fertile regions. We propose, by this paper, to mark out a general plan by which assistance can be rendered to our vast agricultural and commercial people, by a small outlay in comparison to the vast importance of the work to the American people, by inaugurating a system of canals so as to meet the wants of the people. Canals making her more acceptable to sea-going craft, she may, in time, become the second city on the Gulf, and in the South, Pensacola becoming the first.

Chandeleur Island, Cat and Round, with Mississippi Sound, gives the location of New Orleans an advantage over any city in the South. She cannot depend on the Father of Waters alone, for her prosperity, unless she makes some effort to control its power for good, making her easy of access by canal for foreign vessels. Railroads cannot, and will not sustain her. Improving her magnificent water power is her only hope. By taking advantage of what Nature has done for her, the time is not distant when two great Pacific railroads will throw the trade of China and the Pacific coast at her feet. This is no visionary idea of an enthusiast; it can be done. Take the map—look to Texas—a vast territory of itself. Two railroads must extend through the State to the Pacific coast, and New Orleans must meet them. Improve, then, your water, by opening canals; abandon the total idea of ever being able to gain any permanent advantage of any of the Passes at the Mouths. They are the bandages placed over the eyes of the people of New Orleans, that has blinded them to their best interests. They must comprehend the only means of saving the canals of the Mississippi River from overflow, is by a judicious system of canals.

cut-offs, lakes and bayous, and making New Orleans more easy of access to sea-going vessels.

The internal trade of the United States at this time stands preëminently conspicuous, and overshadows all others. Although the export and import trade of our country is largely beyond our comprehension in our infancy as a nation, it is nothing in comparison with our great internal trade. Our country, from its extent of territory, must increase in proportion to the increase of population, which will soon have attained to over a hundred millions or more, developing the resources of a continent—the extent and national wealth of which will vastly exceed those of other nations. Our country, in its extent of domain, has diversity of production. The products of the South being cotton, rice, sugar and tobacco, must be exchanged for the products of the North, creating internal trade of the most gigantic character. As the tide of emigration flows into the new and enticing West, commerce must flow to the East and South, to the great cities of New York and Baltimore, on the Atlantic coast, and New Orleans and Galveston, on the Gulf coast. The cotton, sugar, corn, wheat and bacon of the South and West must be conveyed to these centres of internal trade. At the rate which our wealth and population are increasing, in 1920 our population will be a hundred millions, our wealth will be counted by billions of dollars, our science of government, under no slave institutions, but all free, will be brought to such perfection that the vast wealth produced by our unlimited internal resources will open all the arteries of trade in our common country, moving with beautiful harmony with all the departments of government. Our nation is vast—her bounds are oceans. She must absorb all the continent of North America, which embraces the best part of the world, giving us the means of internal navigation and trade which, if rightly used, must rule the world.

Although our country, vast in extent, is capable of supporting as dense a population as any other nation to the square mile, it is not probable it will be greater than seventy-five to the square mile: Leaving out 2,500,000 square miles for the deserts and cold, inhospitable regions of the extreme north, leaving a balance of eight millions of square miles, we will then have a population of seven hundred millions of inhabitants, speaking the same tongue, and living under one federal government, with internal trade in proportion to the wants of the people, presenting the grandest spectacle of national power and prosperity. Our vast rivers, canals and lakes being the principal routes of internal trade will be taxed beyond their capacity. In 1859 our internal tonnage amounted to four million tons. Such an amount of tonnage shows a large internal traffic. If this is multiplied by ten, we will come in some range of the delivery of goods yearly by vessels engaged in the trade, making our coasting and internal trade greater than England.

Even with this large trade, it is inadequate to the wants of the

American people. The great length of our river navigation and the great want of others must convince any reasonable mind that the inland navigation of the United States, without improvement, is inadequate to the wants of our people. It cannot, and has not, kept pace with the wants of a growing people and a progressive country. But for the snort of the iron horse, the producing districts of the United States would be almost at a dead lock for the means of transporting produce. In 1850 the Erie canal and other canals between Buffalo and New York city, carried annually four million two hundred thousand tons. At that time, only, comparatively, a small portion of the great West was developed. In 1845, the canals carried five million five hundred and ninety-eight thousand tons, being only a small part of the great internal trade between the West and East and East and West. The canals are overtaxed, so much so they will be compelled to enlarge, the most of them transporting to and from the great West. The increase of business on the great Erie canal of New York, in spite of railroads and the savings in transportation, presents one of the most extraordinary examples of what art can do to increase the wealth of a people and the improvement of national trade. The cost of freight between New York and Buffalo before the completion of the canals was \$100 per ton, and from 1850 to 1860 it was \$7 per ton for 364 miles. Freight on canals, exclusive of tolls, is from 1 to 1½ cents per mile; on railroads, 3 to 2½ cents; on steamboats on the lakes, from 3 to 5 cents; on the Mississippi River 1½, or an average of ¾ to 1 cent a mile. These statistics must convince the people of the country, and especially those of the great territories through which the great Sabine and Neosho canal or Sabine-Neosho river passes, of the vast amount and advantage of river and canal navigation over that of railroads. If the people of Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Indian Territory, Missouri and Kansas will only take hold of this great enterprise, their interest in the prosperity of each State and Territory is founded upon common hopes, fears and dangers. In this great enterprise, the great States of the West are all interested so much as to preclude all jealousies and rivalries, inducing a generous and general coöperation of all these great States in this grand enterprise of internal trade, opening and creating new avenues of trade and production, and saving and bringing into market millions of acres of land.

The improving the navigation of the Missouri, Mississippi, Arkansas and Red Rivers, besides securing the thousands of acres of land from overflow by the Mississippi River and its tributaries, by the completion of the great Sabine and Neosho canal, or Sabine-Neosho River, is the object of this paper. The increasing and improving the internal navigation of our country must be of prime importance to the country and the people. They are far beyond the capacity of the people; the nation must be and is deeply concerned. No narrow views of economy and retrench-

ment—no prospective expenditure, however vast, can or should be allowed to deter the Congress of the United States from approaching the solemn act of duty in completing this great internal canal. The internal trade of the rivers, lakes and canals has been immense during the last four or five years, the tonnage on the lakes amounting to over a million tons annually. The railroads conveyed between New York and the cities of the West over ten million of tons of freight. The canals and railroads are over-taxed, showing they are both inadequate to the wants of a growing people and country. With these facts before us, with statistics looking us in the face, although some may sneer and assert anything can be proved by them; but such expressions are peculiar to those that deal in assertions and find it unpleasant to be assured by facts, as they well know statistics are no less than a collection of truths. They will not doubt statistics when they are told the annual amount of commerce entering and passing the mouths of the Mississippi River, from 1837 to 1860, amounted to \$150,000,000 annually, leaving out the vast amount done by its tributaries.

It is, then, to the advantage of the government and the States and Territories interested that the great interest of the country should be increased, and that the ports of the South, and her great water course, with new ones, should be improved and made to the utmost extent, and no local or sectional consideration should for a moment be permitted to stand in the way of developing and promoting the internal trade of our one country. This would do more to revive the prosperity of the South and thereby help to enable the people of the United States to pay and bear the burden of taxation.

The United States government should build levees and grant land and money for the great internal improvement of the commerce of the country.

Let the nation be made a great workshop for its laborers, which would not only revive the prosperity of the South, but the whole country, enabling the people to pay and bear the burden of taxation.

We propose, by Government assistance, to unite the waters of the Missouri River with the waters of the Gulf of Mexico, through a new and safe channel, beginning with a canal at Kansas City, on the Missouri River, running to a branch of the Osage, connecting by canal with the Neosho River at the falls, running two hundred and fifty miles or more to Fort Gibson, on the Arkansas River, then running down the river to Fort Smith, passing round the base of San Boies mountain, through a small branch of the Arkansas River, into a branch of Red River by canal, then running down the Red River some distance to a branch of Red River, connecting by canal through Gaines' Creek, with a branch by canal to Sabine River, running three hundred miles into Sabine Bay. The fall of this great Sabine and Neosho canal, or Sabine

Neosho River, will be two thousand feet, making the canal most feasible and practicable. There will hardly be one hundred and fifty miles of canal; but the great benefit will be in the changing the courses of these great rivers in high water, so as to save lands in lower Mississippi and Arkansas from overflow, reclaiming hundreds of thousands of acres of the best lands of the finest part of our country. The land in Kansas, and Indian Territory, and Texas, will increase in value millions of dollars, and support a more dense population than could live in the Mississippi bottoms, under the present levee system. This great canal, saving all the lands on the Mississippi River and Arkansas and Red Rivers, doing away with the levees entirely, can be completed at a cost of twenty-five millions of dollars, and will last for all time. This great river or canal running through a country vast in extent, can be completed in three years, at a cost of nine millions of dollars. The annual trade that will pass through the Sabine Bay at Sabine City, and through all the courses of this Sabine Neosho River will amount to over three hundred and fifty millions of dollars the first few years, if it is a success, and there is no reason why it should not be. The great disadvantages now attending the immigrants of Texas and this great Western world, is the great cost of transport. Though the cost eventually falls on the consumer, it is obvious it must affect the producer, as showing the fact if the prime cost of the produce and the cost of transport exceeds the value of the article in the market, shipment of produce is unprofitable, and the demand ceases.

Give the people of the United States the freest and fullest access to the great centres of trade in our own country and Europe, with the lowest and cheapest price for carriage to market, with a certainty of speedy transport to all the reclaimed lands and remote lands from market, by the completion of this great inland river, it will augment the price of land, stimulate the supply and demand for the products of the Western world, making it bloom as the rose, and abound with wealth. By the completion of this great Sabine and Neosho canal, or Sabine-Neosho River, practically developing a country unequalled in point of health, climate and resources by any part of the United States. The amount of territory opened by this great work of art to emigrants and internal trade to the country, and the amount of land reclaimed from the overflow of the Mississippi River and its tributaries, will complete and sustain in cost twenty times this great internal arterial course of trade. It will open in Kansas and Indian Territory west of the States of Missouri and Arkansas, and South of the Platte River, 248,850 square miles, or 159,264,645 acres of land to steam navigation; it will save from overflow in Arkansas 200,000 acres of land; in Louisiana, 200,000 acres, and in Mississippi 100,000 or more acres. It will not only reclaim thousands of acres of land, but it will improve the navigation of all those great rivers. The amount of water flowing in the channel of the Missouri, at

Kansas City, at high water, the river being one mile wide and 160 feet deep, with a velocity of six miles an hour, would give us a discharge of 2,533,300,000 gallons of water a minute. The amount of water at Baton Rouge, discharged at high water in the Mississippi, say the river is two miles wide and 320 feet deep, with eight miles velocity, would give 24,789,248,000 gallons per minute. The Arkansas, at high water, at Pine Bluffs, one and a half mile wide and 180 feet deep, and five miles velocity per hour, will give 1,637,202,500 gallons each minute. Red river, at Alexandria, channel one mile wide in high water and 80 feet deep, current three miles an hour, gives 309,068,000 gallons each minute. As we have no data to make these calculations from, we presume they can only approximate correctness, but they will give us a faint idea of the amount of water pouring into the great waters of the Mississippi every moment of the day, during a freshet. We cannot wonder at the overflow and the shiftings of channels in these great rivers, from the amount of water and the rapidity of the flow of water in their unequal channels, nor the vast floods of water that flow through them to the Gulf. The source of the Missouri is 4,000 feet above the level of the sea; the Platte, 3,500; the Kansas, 32,00; Arkansas River, 2,500, and the Red River 2,200.

All these rivers have a southern flow of water, running with great rapidity, making it easy to complete this great Sabine and Neosho canal or Sabine-Neosho River. To the United States this grand internal navigation enterprise must be of the greatest importance and most absorbing of all internal improvements; and to the inhabitants of those locked up territories a saving from annual inundation of the fairest and most fertile portions of the South. The completion of this canal would increase the wealth and prosperity of this fair country, saved and improved by this gigantic work, millions of dollars, conveying its prosperous trade to all parts of our country, and relieving a heavy weight of misery and suffering caused by the annual overflow of the magnificent valley of the Mississippi River.

The levee system never can be a success, or give lasting security against the torrents of the Father of Waters. His Samsonic hair must be cut; shearing him of his curly locks, by canals and lakes, and throwing more than one-half of the waters into the Gulf, through other channels, thereby creating new and profitable trade. We must learn lessons of experience from history, in controlling our water courses, so as to make them more safe, and of greater use to the country through which they pass; thus dispensing blessings in the place of annual destruction. History gives us an example in the control of the Nile in the days of King Moeris, by creating an artificial lake, the noblest and most wonderful of all the structures or works of the kings of Egypt. Heroditus considers it vastly superior to the pyramids and labyrinths of that wonderful mechanical people. As Egypt was more or less

fruitful in proportion to the inundations of the Nile, and, as in those frequent floods the too great or too little rise of the waters was equally fatal to the lands, King Moeris, to prevent these two inconveniences, and correct, as far as lay in his power, the irregularities of the Nile, thought proper to call art to the assistance of nature, and caused to be constructed a lake which took his name. It was one hundred and eighty French leagues in circumference, and three hundred feet deep. It had connection with the Nile by a great canal more than twelve miles long and fifty feet wide. Great sluices either opened or shut the canal and lake, as occasion required. When the Nile was too high, the canal opened, and saved the lands from fatal consequences. The lands remained covered no longer than was necessary for good crops. When it was dry, and the lands were suffering for water, this great reservoir was opened and let out by drains to water the lands. In this manner, the irregularities of the Nile were corrected.

The lands, then, on the Mississippi River and its tributaries can be saved by a change of the course of the waters, and by the completion of this great Sabine-Neosho River, or Sabine and Neosho Canal, throwing one-half, or more, of the water that now passes from the mouth of the Arkansas to the Gulf, by this canal, through the Sabine River, also connecting the waters of the upper Tennessee by canal through Wills' Valley to the Coosa River, running through the Alabama into the Gulf, and connecting the waters of the Yazoo and Big Black Rivers, in the State of Mississippi, with Pearl River running to the Gulf, and deepening the outlets of the Atchafalaya, Plaquemine and Lafourche Bayous, through which vast quantities of water from the Mississippi find their home in the Gulf, by increasing the opening of the river West Bay, and Barrataria Bay, and a canal from Pintala Hacha, and from Versailles to Lake Borgne, and a canal below New Orleans to Black Bay.

The propriety of opening a larger canal higher up on the Mississippi to Lake Ponchartrain, may be doubted, but it will be of vast advantage to New Orleans as regards internal navigation. It will increase her commerce beyond the expectations of her people, and it will do more to deepen the waters at the Balize, than any one thing that can be done, in improving the depth and navigation of the Mississippi. Open these avenues for the waters, and the time, if not already present, will come, when large sea-going vessels will pass up through some of these openings to the city of New Orleans. For we know all these outlets reach the Gulf by shorter courses and much deeper water than we have at the Pass. I cannot agree with the theory that the swifter and straighter the course of the Mississippi the deeper the channel. This swift current is the cause of washing off the banks, and washing away the channels and filling the river up. Check the velocity and volume of water in a stream, and that stream becomes deeper and more navigable. Look at all the bayous and sluggish rivers of Louisiana and Arkansas. Do you find them ever shallow or in need of

water? The hottest and dryest summer they seem to be always at a stand. The Alabama, the crookedest river in the United States, is perhaps the best for navigation.

We cannot go into the details. Our plan for the improvement of the Mississippi is the only one. The levee system has proved expensive, and when it breaks increases the danger to all the country around. Creating cut-offs in the river, and straightening the channel of the river, cannot prevent the filling of the channel. But making new, and opening old outlets, and changing the course of the volume of water in the Missouri, Arkansas and Red Rivers, and throwing the large volume of water by the Sabine or Neosho Canal, or Sabine-Neosho River on the West, into the Gulf at Sabine Bay, and on the East, throwing the waters of the Yazoo River and Big Black into Pearl river, thence into the Gulf, and the upper waters of the Tennessee through Wills Valley, to the Coosa River, thence into the Alabama to Mobile Bay, is the only way to control the Father of Waters, and render a lasting blessing to mankind. This great river being the outlet of an immense valley, and the great traveling and commercial thoroughfare of this vast country, whatever affects the permanency of its channel, or general character as a navigable stream, must excite an interest in the minds of the people of the Union, but more especially those that reside in the immediate valley.

The vast injury done by the great overflows of the Mississippi, in the last two or three years, and even anterior to that, or this time, have almost reduced the price of lands to nothing; and without some grand system of protecting this beautiful and fertile portion of our country, it will become again the home of the bear and the wolf. By following out the plan of the great Sabine and Neosho Canal and decreasing the water in the Mississippi river, millions of acres of land can be saved, and the health of the valley and inland navigation improved beyond our most sanguine expectations, at millions of dollars less expense than by the levee system, which cannot be a success, on account of the alluvial banks of these rivers, which change the course, sometimes washing away large plantations in one night. By this system of changing the course of rivers, the navigation of all these great rivers will be improved. Boats will pass from St. Louis to Galveston, by the way of this great Sabine and Neosho Canal, or Sabine-Neosho River, carrying merchandise and produce to all parts of the Western world.

New Orleans becoming the centre of the grandest internal trade of the continent, in point of health and location, it will be improved a thousand fold; from being a damp locality, it will become comparatively dry, and the country around and on the banks of the Mississippi, will become the most inviting, healthful, and densely populated section in the United States.

The unreflecting may tell us that this cannot be done, but reason and common sense will teach any one that will study all the

bearings of these great rivers, that it is the only way to make the valley of the Mississippi the abode of man.

The cost of all these improvements will be far less than the uncertain and costly system of leveeing these great rivers. Thinking of the immense extent of this valley, containing within its limits one million two hundred thousand square miles, extending from North to South, the full length of our vast country, and the course of the great internal trade of North America, and lying between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, can we for a moment believe that this vast valley, teeming with millions of human beings, and millions of money, will suffer this wild torrent to remain uncontrolled, ruling madly his forest inheritance.

The cost of all these improvements will be far less than the uncertain and costly system of levees. To the great work of completing this great Western Sabine and Neosho Canal, or Sabine-Neosho River, I have, in a feeble manner, called the attention of the people of the West to its grand importance, and to the only lasting mode of saving the overflowed lands of the river valleys, at a less cost than keeping up the levee system of the three great States of the South. The circumstances which have brought me to this train of thought, are a minute and personal acquaintance with the country through which I propose to construct this great canal; and a residence in the Mississippi bottoms, in high water, has long taught me the futility of levees.

So long as the vast quantity of water is allowed to flow in the channel of the Mississippi, and the present old system of levees, and the condition of the river, is permitted to continue, all attempts to prevent overflows, and the damage resulting from mere temporary and local improvements, it matters not how costly, must prove utterly futile.

The system of improving and preventing overflows in the Mississippi, must be radically changed. These improvements must be general, uniform, and of a consistent character, before any permanent benefit can be derived from the expenditures, which the giving away of levees renders yearly necessary. It is, therefore, the duty of the government, and the people of the great West, to open the great Sabine-Neosho River, or Sabine and Neosho Canal, and the canals recommended to open other outlets for the waters of the Mississippi, and the throwing the waters of the Big Black and Yazoo Rivers, by a canal into Pearl River, thence to the Gulf of Mexico and the waters of Tennessee River, by a canal, through Wills Valley, into the Coosa River, into the Alabama, to the Gulf.

The adoption of this plan to save the Mississippi Valley, is the only means, in my humble judgment, to remedy the evils consequent upon the present condition of the river, or relieve the agricultural interest along its banks and tributaries, from heavy losses yearly, securing or saving commerce and real estate from annual ruin.

Our inheritance is beyond our comprehension, our climate superior, our country bounded by oceans and traversed by noble rivers and lakes. In my humble opinion, all that is needed to make us the most prosperous and strongest nation of the globe, is to develop the intercommunication of our country, and place strong bridles on our wild water-horses which eat so much of our wealth, annually swallowing millions of acres of our choicest land as their food.

When all these improvements are made, and the iron horse breathes the Atlantic and Pacific air, we can then be called the first nation of the earth, for extent and density of soil and climate, and internal communication, and the variety and inexhaustible successes with labor, capital and enterprise, will entitle our country to the first rank.

Our country—the great nation—we boast of our greatness—she is emphatically the great nation. Where can we find our country's equal in geographical and natural advantages, in material progress or in general prosperity? As a united and a free people, the United States presents to the nations of the world a spectacle that must excite the grandest wonder and admiration.

It is with the most sincere good wishes for the comfort and happiness of my countrymen, that I wish to see buried all discord and all jealousies, and the settlement of all irritating questions by mutual concessions and harmonious coöperation, and each to endeavor to emulate in the development of those arts which tend to universal happiness, which is based on the promotion of amity and the preservation of peace, and the united efforts of our great government and people in the development of our vast internal commerce.

I remain a firm believer in the only plan of developing the territory of the West, by the great Sabine and Neosho canal, and the converting of waters that flow into the Mississippi into other channels, as the only mode of protecting the low lands from overflow. It needs no argument to prove that the evils arising from the present condition of the Mississippi River are yearly increasing, and that the time has come when some permanent improvement must be adopted to save the country from so many heavy losses and expenses entailed on the dwellers in the valley by periodical floods already surpassing, in the aggregate, the cost of the system of improvement herein recommended, being simple and comparatively cheap, and entirely in accordance with the laws of nature, which must be adopted on account of economy, as the only mode by which the agricultural and internal trade of our country can be saved from heavy and frequent losses.

The extent of territory washed by the Father of Waters, the extent of territory through which it flows, and the vast and important interests which have grown into existence upon its borders, and now lie exposed to the ravages of inundation, render it utterly impossible that its power can be controlled and its

defects remedied, except by this grand canal, and this can only be done by government assistance. The government must direct its energies to this great highway of internal commerce. It can no longer be neglected, in justice to the people and the nation.

All these great improvements can be made for twenty-five millions. The great canal will cost about eight millions, and the improvement of the Mississippi by other canals, making shorter cuts to the Gulf, and the throwing of the high waters of the Tennessee into the Gulf by Mobile, and the Big Black and Yazoo Rivers into Pearl River to the Gulf, will all cost seventeen million dollars.

The improvement will be permanent and lasting, the lands saved and brought into market, and the security to real estate will twenty times pay the expenses of the canals and the changing of the water courses—increasing our internal commerce, not by thousands, but by millions.

Respectfully, JOHN H. HENRY.

ART. VIII.—AMERICAN PIONEERING, AS CONNECTED WITH THE PROGRESS AND DESTINY OF THE UNITED STATES.

BY EDWARD E. DUNBAR.

I will now touch upon another important branch of my subject—one that relates directly to our pioneer enterprise and general progress—namely, Spanish America, and our relations with that part of the continent. Here, again, it would appear that we have failed to comprehend our interests and our destiny. It is true that an idea of "manifest destiny" having more or less to do with the future of Spanish America, has obtained a lodgment in the American mind. Of late years we have heard much about the "manifest destiny" of the American nation; but so far as I can perceive, this idea is exceedingly vague, having no intelligent or logical basis, nor any well-defined policy or system by which it is to be wrought out.

In our relations with Spanish America, we have practically labored against the happy fulfillment of the manifest-destiny idea.

I will give a brief summary of facts bearing directly on this point:

Our relations with the island of Cuba, probably from its geographical position and other favorable circumstances, are more extensive and profitable than with any other locality in Spanish America. My commercial calculations are based on the statistics of 1860, as the war, since that period, has caused such irregularity

and change as to deprive us of data upon which to base any regular or reliable estimate.

From 1820 to 1850, a period of thirty years, our commercial exchanges with Cuba ranged from ten to fifteen millions only per annum.

In 1860, our commercial exchange with that island amounted to \$46,428,434, or \$33.25 *per capita*, giving 1,396,530 as the population.

What is the cause of this sudden and immense trade between the United States and Cuba? I reply, the steamship! In 1850, lines of American steamers commenced plying between New York, Charleston, New Orleans and Havana, and in 1860 our commercial exchanges with the last-named port had augmented to over \$46,000,000, which is equal to one-half the entire foreign trade of the island, and double the total amount of our trade with all the other West India Islands.

Cuba lay in our ocean highway to New Orleans and Aspinwall. Communication by steam became a necessity, and the island has been practically, so far as its commercial interests and relations were concerned, within the American Union since 1850 and up to the commencement of our civil disturbance in 1860. This, I believe, was simply a collateral result of private enterprise, growing out of increased trade with New Orleans, and the commencement of intercourse with California.

In the relations that grew up between the United States and Cuba during the decade mentioned, I see the idea of manifest destiny logically and happily developed.

With Cuba, everything favorable or fortunate in our Spanish-American relations ends. Take Mexico, for instance. When Mexico became an independent State, in 1821 our trade with her commenced, and in the course of ten years it had reached \$15,000,000 per annum. But since 1830 the trade has been irregular, and the tendency downward, so that in 1860 the commercial exchanges between Mexico and the United States—that is, our imports from and exports to that country—had fallen to \$5,905,103, and this, notwithstanding Mexico joins our Southern border, and the trade of the whole Mexican Pacific coast had been open to California for ten years.

Taking the inhabitants of Mexico at 7,000,000, the trade of that country *per capita* with the United States in 1860 was 84 cents. If Mexico had the same annual *per capita* trade with the United States that Cuba has, it would amount to \$228,750,000 per annum.

There are in the Mexican domain several Californias for us, simply through the instrumentality of treaties of amity and commerce—a means of progress our rulers appear to know very little about. The perversity with which our people and government have acted with regard to our interest in Mexico, cannot be explained by any of the known laws by which human affairs are

supposed to be influenced or regulated. It seems as though we knowingly and deliberately aided in bringing about the dire misfortune of foreign intervention in Mexico, the real and greater purpose of which was ultimately intervention in the United States.

My remarks respecting our relations with Mexico are, in the main, applicable to all Spanish America.

In 1860, the commercial exchanges of Spanish America with all the world were, in round numbers, \$525,000,000, of which \$115,000,000 only were with the United States. Of this latter amount, \$65,000,000 were with Cuba and the other West India islands, leaving to the United States but \$50,000,000, or one-tenth of the Spanish-American trade on the main land—the total of which was \$460,000,000 with all countries. And yet we have all advantages over other countries that should give us the command of the greater portion of that trade.

The total population of the continental part of Spanish America is 33,000,000, and our trade with that population amounts to but \$50,000,000 per annum, or \$1.52 *per capita*. What an unfortunate exhibit! If our trade with all Spanish America averaged the same *per capita* as it does with Cuba, it would amount to \$1,163,750,000 per annum! These are stupendous numerals. It is within the bounds of reason to say that, by an intelligent culture of commercial intercourse with Spanish America, our trade with that portion of the continent and its islands would, within a few years, reach \$500,000,000 per annum. What a magnificent field for the pioneer enterprise of this country!

But where does the greater part of the Spanish-American trade go? To Europe—principally to England. The English mail steamers completely encircle Spanish America, touching at upward of seventy different ports on the continent and islands.

Having given the small commercial results of our intercourse with Spanish America, I will bring forward several other points as evidence of how we have almost entirely ignored the existence of that part of our continent as anything worthy of commercial or social culture.

One-half this continent is occupied by Spanish America, and one-half the people inhabiting this continent speak the Spanish language. And yet what child, what statesman in this country, is reared in view of these great facts? Is the study of the grand old Spanish language, or the history of Spanish America, common among us? Does a knowledge of the races, language, laws, politics, religion and customs that prevail in Spanish America constitute any part of the education of our public men—those whom we honor with the highest positions and dignify with the appellation of statesmen? Let the facts answer. If you place your child in the best schools or academies of the country, with the desire to give him a superior education, or lay the foundation for it, not one in fifty affords the advantage of instruction in the

Spanish language; and if, by chance, you are able to arrange for a teacher in this language, it is done with so much difficulty and extra expense as to be available only to the wealthy. As to any correct history of Spanish America for reading or study, it is not to be found in the literature of our country, nor in any other country, I believe, if truth and fairness are made the standard.

Go to Washington, among the high officials, the leading men, the politicians of the day, and how many do you find who are able to form an intelligent opinion of any event that occurs in Spanish America? I have heard that it has been remarked by the foreign diplomatic corps in Washington, that not one of the present administration can converse intelligently with the respective Spanish-American Ministers accredited to this government, relative to the countries they represent, even in the English language, saying nothing of the Spanish. This should be a deep national mortification.

Furthermore, it is a deplorable fact that the government has rarely sent a representative to the Spanish-American countries who had any knowledge of the people or their language. At the present time, if I am correctly informed, we have not a single ambassador in Spanish America, and scarcely a consul who knows anything of the Spanish language, or who, by education or experience, is calculated to promote our interests in that portion of the continent, no matter how zealous and faithful he may be in his efforts to perform his duty.

These are all very grave facts, and they clearly set forth in my mind (and I hope they do to that of others) how little our people and government comprehend their great interest in the direction of the India south of us. They afford indubitable evidence of how entirely neglectful we have been of sound and healthy progress, in a natural and available direction. And what is the consequence? A very serious loss to our national interests, and calamitous complications in our foreign and domestic policy.

Spanish America is an enigma to the whole world. To my mind the solution of this enigma is exceedingly simple. We have only to appreciate the great fact which stands so boldly out in modern history, that from its discovery to the present hour, this continent has been looked upon by Europe as a pure commercial speculation, in the development of which, the common principles of humanity and Christianity were not to have, and consequently, have not had, lot or part.

What may be termed commercial slavery never was known until the commercial nations of Europe fastened it upon this continent as a pure speculation, bereft of all justice and humanity. The soil of these nations at home must be free, but the soil of their possessions in the New World must be slave. What a record of shame the commercial nations of Europe exhibit on this point! While they were declaring that the moment a slave set foot on the

soil of the respective mother countries he became free, they were absolutely encouraging and sustaining the African slave trade, with their armies and navies, and enforcing, by arms and legislation, the institution of slavery over this continent and its islands, from pole to pole, and from ocean to ocean.

In 1772, Lord Mansfield ruled in the famous case of the slave Somerset, that no law of England recognized chattel slavery on English soil, and that a negro slave from one of the British colonies became free the moment he arrived at a British port. At this very time the American colonies were urgently protesting to the mother country against the importation of negro slaves within their limits. In 1775, three years after the decision of Lord Mansfield, and just before our war of revolution broke out, the British government abruptly and sternly gave a quietus to these protests of the colonies, in the following words: "We cannot allow the colonies to check or discourage, in any degree, a traffic so beneficial to the nation."

This remarkable exhibition of the unfeeling spirit of gain by which the English government was actuated in this matter, tells the whole story. It lays bare the animus by which commercial Europe held the New World in its grasp. And it is the same now as it was then. There has been no change.

Our revolutionary war, and the Spanish-American war of independence were the natural upheavings of people to relieve themselves from an intolerable system of oppression, inflicted upon them by the parent nations of Europe. The United States met with a great and constantly increasing degree of success, until all Europe began to bow to the progress and power of the great republic, as to the decree of fate, and to hold the American nation in some sort of humane and christian respect. Then our civil war commences.

The Spanish-American countries, on the other hand, succeeded in throwing off the Spanish yoke only to relapse so completely into the clutches of commercial Europe, as to render their condition, since they became republics, but little, if any, better than it was when they were enslaved to Spain.

If you would arrive at a correct understanding of the Spanish-American republics, you will find the lust and avarice of the Christian nations the main cause of the chronic evils by which they are afflicted. I contend that public opinion respecting these republics is wrong. The Spanish-American people, if I understand them aright, have capacities and aspirations for a far higher order of existence than they now enjoy, and if they could but disenthral themselves from the cruel bonds in which they are so tightly held by commercial Europe, they would rise rapidly in the scale of nations.

Furthermore, I cannot leave the point without referring you to the promptitude with which the leading maritime nations of Europe adopted the course they thought would regain to them the

inhuman grasp in which they originally held this entire continent, so soon as it became evident that the only Power thereon they had ever respected, was involved in serious civil strife. I consider it a piece of sublime simplicity on the part of the politicians, both North and South, to have believed those nations ever would, or ever will, pursue any other course.

ART. IX—THE MANCHAC PROJECT.

In consequence of the importance attached to this way of communication between the Mississippi and the Gulf, by way of Lake Pontchartrain, we have published the Report of Gen. McAlester, Major of Engineers, to Major Gen. Humphreys, Chief of Engineers, and as reported by the latter to the Secretary of War, by whom it has been communicated to Congress, and printed as a Public Document. This Report must be relied on as the most accurate and important statement of the advantages and defects of the proposed route. When we add, that this Report is "concurrent in" by Maj. Gen. Humphreys, the able Engineer, who has studied so well the hydrography of the Mississippi and the Gulf, we have done all that is necessary to give to our readers a first class authority on the subject. We will, however, add something ourselves, by way of comment, on this enterprise. We are the friends of all development, whether the measure proposed suit one or another local interest. If we looked solely at the interest of New Orleans, we should have no fear that a new way of access could injure it, and we would like it opened accordingly, according to its capacity.

The North-west is taking a deep interest in this scheme. This is very gratifying, because it shows that the interior is determined to reach the sea by the best route. All the speeches and essays on the subject will tend to enlighten the public mind, and will all assist in showing the importance of deepening the great outlet at the Balize. With one hundred millions bushels of grain which may be exported, provided the outlet were deep enough for a first class grain vessel, and the freight reduced in proportion, the North-west cannot dispense with this great outlet. It will not be insulted by an appropriation of \$100,000 to open the mouth of the Mississippi, when New York asks a million or two to clear out a single entrance to her harbor. The North-west will not grow grain, or build elevators in vain. It will not be deluded by large appropriations for the improvement of the upper tributaries of the Mississippi, which bring grain down to the intersection of the Eastern railroads and canals, while they practically dam up the great outlet of the corn empire of the West. The North-west will order its representatives in Congress to demand this important measure. For the same reasons we are sincerely glad to see such

manifestations of interest on the part of the South, in the practical means of restoring our prosperity. If either of the interests which have made the late demonstrations upon the subject, be successful in a greater or less degree, they will secure guarantees of a material alliance with the great producing interior, infinitely stronger than those woven at Washington by the most astute politicians of the olden time.

We repeat the conviction that there is no incompatibility between the interests and the progress of the Gulf States. If the commerce of the West be opened with the outports of the South and the markets of the world, there is enough for all our cities. If Boston and other New England cities, New York, its suburbs, and interior towns, Philadelphia and Baltimore, have all been built up into wealth and power by this trade, what can hinder a series of Southern cities, separated from each other by far greater intervals of distance than those we have mentioned, from acquiring similar elements of prosperity from the same source? We make this declaration to insure a candid consideration for the views which we propose to advance on the trade between Mobile and the Mississippi. The ways of communication open to this trade are: 1. By the River and Gulf. 2. By two canals and the Pontchartrain Railroad, through New Orleans. There are some other projects: 1. The route by Manchac and the Lakes. 2. A canal from the English Turn to Lake Borgne, of which we will give the explanation that follows:

A pamphlet has been placed in our hands, by which it appears that a charter was granted by the Legislature of Louisiana some thirteen years since, authorizing "the construction of the Grand Junction Canal to unite the Mississippi River with the Gulf of Mexico, ten miles below New Orleans." It was designed to unite the Mississippi with Lake Borgne, through the Bayou Philpon. The canal would depart from the English Turn with a cut of two miles. Bayou Philpon then affords a depth of twelve feet. Ten feet can be carried into the Gulf, where it would "find eight feet soundings immediately." Eight feet would then govern the tonnage on this route from New Orleans to the Gulf. Besides, there is a plan to cut a canal from the Mississippi to the Gulf, at a point near Fort St. Philip. We propose to consider these several routes comparatively.

1. The Manchac Route. We copy from the *St. Louis Dispatch* the hydrography of this route, to which that paper sees "serious objections." It says, "the Bayou, with Lake Mauripas, is about fifty-five miles long, is necessarily crooked," is crossed by a railroad, and difficult to open and keep open. Lake Pontchartrain is thirty-five miles long, with a depth of from seven to ten feet. Passing through the Rigolets the outlet of Pontchartrain, the route passes through ten miles of Lake Borgne, into the Mississippi Sound, eighty miles long. "At the eastern end of the Sound" is Grant's Pass, an artificial channel, about a mile long, just

"wide enough for two boats to pass each other, with an awkward angle at its middle point, and with a depth of not over five feet." From this Pass to Mobile city is, by the Mobile Bay and River, twenty-eight miles; or, by the head of Spanish River, which lengthens this section to forty miles. We may add, that the Mobile River only affords, below the city of Mobile, nine feet of water.

2. The routes already in operation through this city are, first, the New Canal; second, the old Bayou St. John Canal; and, third, the Pontchartrain Railroad, now connected with the Mississippi River. We will dispose of these routes, including the Manchac, all of which are to be comprehended under a single point of view.

They must all pass through Lake Pontchartrain, with a depth of seven to ten feet, and through Grant's Pass, which is set down as not exceeding seven feet. As, therefore, the ruling depth of channel is the same on the routes we have thus grouped, the communication between the Mississippi and Mobile is narrowed to a comparison of the time and distance to Mobile by these routes respectively: 1. From Bayou Manchac to Grant's Pass, according to estimate of the *Dispatch*, is 180 miles. 2. From Bayou Manchac, by way of the Mississippi and New Orleans, to Grant's Pass, the (approximate) distance is 225 miles. As the ruling depth of channel is the same on these routes, and the distance is not materially greater by way of New Orleans than by way of the Bayou Manchac, the comparison resolves itself into a question of, 1. Freights. 2. Transfer, time and charges. 3. Incidental advantages.

To clear the subject still further, we will assume that the North-west will not take its foreign and coastwise bulk trade off the Mississippi, which has already an outlet channel of eighteen feet, to send it around and up to Mobile for exportation over a channel of nine feet. This will reduce the comparison between the Manchac and New Orleans routes to Mobile. We proceed, then, to consider:

1. The freights. The freights upon the Mississippi River to New Orleans, must be cheaper than for a corresponding length of voyage on the Manchac route, because there is a heavier trade to New Orleans than to Mobile. The shipments made from the West to New Orleans for domestic consumption, are accompanied by the foreign and coastwise exportations. These domestic shipments must, therefore, come more cheaply to New Orleans for these reasons: A steamer brings a tow of five barges to New Orleans; the cargoes of two are for domestic consumption, and the three others for exportation. It follows that the steamer can carry the domestic cargo cheaper than if it carried nothing more. Again, the city of New Orleans, as a large cotton port attracts a large tonnage, and this tonnage comes in light, because the balance of tonnage is in favor of our export trade. This fact gives us import freights up the river, so that the steamer which brings

down the two barges for domestic consumption, has some freight back. Our readers may here note the advantage of a through trade. It brings more tonnage, promotes competition, and actually enables us to receive our domestic trade cheaper than if we were without it. We claim, therefore, that the freights upon the New Orleans route to Mobile are cheaper than by way of Manchac.

2. Transfer, time and charges. We adopt again, the authority of the *Dispatch* for the assertion that there must be a transfer from river to lake and gulf craft:

"A Mississippi boat can doubtless go through Pontchartrain in safety, as it is too shallow to permit waves of sufficient height to annoy even the low and frail boats of the river, but how is it with Lake Borgne and Mississippi Sound? The swell that is almost always met on emerging from the Rigolets into Lake Borgne, is a serious thing to a Mississippi steamboat, and if the wind is from the East or the North-east, it is simply impossible for the boat to venture to move until the swell abates. The Mississippi Sound is itself so long, that an Easterly wind can raise waves that, though trifling to such staunch crafts as the Hudson River and Sound boats, with their high guards, are of serious import to our low and unprotected Western river steamers. The boats that ply between Mobile and Lake Pontchartrain are built on the model of the Long Island Sound and the Northern Lake steamers."

Speaking of the transfer in the open roadstead below Mobile, the *Dispatch* says: "To expect Mississippi boats to attempt to discharge directly into an ocean sailing vessel, is to expect of them what none of the class of steamers that ply on the Alabama and Tombigby think of doing." It moreover says that "as far as barges are concerned, the projected route seems utterly impracticable." We assume, then, that a transfer of Western cargoes from river to lake craft is necessary at some point between Manchac and Mobile. Can there be any doubt that the city of New Orleans, with ready built warehouses, with sufficient shelter, with cheap and abundant labor, is far more proper for transshipping these cargoes than any point on the Manchac route?

3. Incidental advantages. In addition to the advantages enumerated, New Orleans has capital and a market. It certainly regulates the prices of Western products, and the shipper by this route can sell or send on to Mobile, as may be most to his interest.

From these arguments we feel assured that the trade between Mobile and the Mississippi can be conducted with more advantage through New Orleans than by way of Manchac. We do not doubt that this will involve the construction of some additional improvements in the transfer at this city. It will, moreover, give to Mobile the advantage of the competition among the various routes, and this we can assure her citizens is much better than being in the hands of a Manchac monopoly.

It is in this connection that we refer to the plan for connecting the trade of the Mississippi by a canal from English Turn to the Gulf. This would give this trade a better depth of water than that by Grant's Pass outlet. It could not be a very expensive transfer or portage, because the whole cost of the canal is estimated in the report before us at about a quarter of a million of dollars.

In proceeding, therefore, to the publication of the Engineer's report, we repeat our wish, in a periodical devoted to the development of Southern interests and the advocates of an alliance with the West, that every way of commercial communication shall be opened which may tend to benefit any part of the South. It is alike our wish and our duty to publish all the argument and authority upon such subjects; and we promote that purpose by laying before our readers of the South and West the following report on

THE MANCHAC ROUTE.

UNITED STATES ENGINEER OFFICE,
New Orleans, Louisiana, December 30, 1867. }

General—By Engineer Department letter, dated Washington, March 12, 1867, I was ordered, in addition to my other duties, as soon as practicable, to cause a survey to be made of Bayou Manchac, connecting with the Amite River, and leading into Lake Mauripas and Pass Manchac, connecting Mauripas and Lake Pontchartrain, and to submit a plan and estimate of the cost of opening said stream and bayous to first-class steamboat navigation—the project to include the opening of the head of Bayou Manchac in the Mississippi River, and connecting the navigation of that river with the streams and lakes mentioned.

In pursuance of these orders, I assigned First Lieutenant J. K. Hezlep, corps of engineers, to the duty of conducting the field-work of the examination and survey, about the 20th of April last (he having returned from Fort Morgan on the completion of the operations under his superintendence at that place), supplying him with the necessary instructions, verbal and written, for the purpose. Copies of his report and estimates, and accompanying maps (with profiles, sections, etc., marked A), are herewith submitted.

The completion and transmittal of this report has been delayed by the death of Lieutenant Hezlep, of yellow fever, which took place on the 13th of August last, and before the estimate could be fully completed (as to the cost of locks, flood-gates, etc.), and by the subsequent suspension of all engineering operations under my charge in this vicinity on account of the yellow fever epidemic.

Lieutenant Hezlep's report is respectfully referred to for a very full description of the features and peculiarities of the channels and water-ways surveyed, their tributaries or branches, the coun-

try adjacent, and the soil to be dealt with. In connection with the difficulties and cost of establishing and maintaining the proposed continued channel for navigation between the Mississippi River and Lake Pontchartrain, the following considerations, resulting from the floods to which the Mississippi is annually subject, should also be borne in mind, viz:

1. The liability to extensive deposits in and in front of the river entrance of the proposed Bayou Manchac canal, incidental to a shifting of the river bed towards the west bank, necessitating proportional excavations as the floods gradually subside.

2. Incidental to the liability of the river to shift its bed toward its easterly bank, the tendency of the waters to cut away the river bank where the junction is made, undermining the flood-gates and locks, and convert the canal into a crevasse, flooding and damaging not only the canal and the proposed channel way to Lake Mauripas, but the neighboring country and plantations.

3. The liability to crevasses in the Mississippi levees above and below the Bayou Manchac, causing the flooding of the proposed channel and canal, and of all the swamps and bottoms between the reverse slope of the river and Lake Mauripas. The great crevasse of 1862, which occurred in the vicinity of Bayou Manchac, and between it and Baton Rouge, caused the water to rise in these swamps and bottoms to a line two and one-half miles from the river, and to a level twenty-two feet above the normal level of the water surface in the proposed channel and canal. (See map A for high-water line and mark of this crevasse.)

The second and third dangers are liable to be realized during the progress of excavations and constructions connected with the proposed Bayou Manchac canal navigation, to the injury of important parts of the work, and perhaps the total destruction of others. The power of Mississippi floods is too great to admit of control to the extent of obviating the first and second liabilities. The danger resulting from the third might be guarded against by means of levees on both sides of the proposed channel way, extending from near Lake Mauripas to the vicinity of the Mississippi levee. These are not, however, included in the project and estimates. The expense entailed by any flooding of the excavations and constructions in the proposed canal during their progress, though they might be very great, are of so indefinite a character as not to admit of estimates.

The dimensions of the largest first-class steamboats now employed on the Mississippi River are as follows: Great Republic, 330 feet long, 95 feet beam, 6 to 7 feet draught, loaded; Richmond, 340 feet long, 86 feet beam, 6 to 7 feet draught, loaded; but as boats of the peculiar construction adapted for river navigation cannot be trusted on Lake Pontchartrain, much less on the Mississippi Sound, I have taken the steamboats of the "Morgan Line," plying between this city and Mobile, through Lake Pontchartrain, Mississippi Sound and Mobile Bay, as specimens of

"first-class steamboats," such as are alluded to in the order directing the survey, these being in every sense first-class steamboats, with side-wheels, and so constructed as to navigate the Mississippi River as well as the other waters named, with safety and efficiency. The largest of these is the Mary, 235 feet long, 60 feet beam over all (including the guards necessary for side wheels), and 6 feet 6 inches draught for ordinary loads. Vessels drawing more than 6 feet 6 inches find difficulty in navigating the lake and portions of the sound.

On this basis I have assumed the locks to have in the clear 250 feet length, 65 feet width; and the channel-way between the locks and Lake Pontchartrain to have a width at the bottom of 45 yards; the depth of water at extreme low water being 7 feet, which width will permit boats to pass each other readily at low speed. The arrangement of gates for locks so wide, sufficiently strong, and admitting at the same time of easy and rapid manipulation, will present considerable difficulty; but possibly the difficulty may be overcome by adopting gates of heavy construction and of great strength, moved by auxiliary machinery; otherwise the boats might be reduced in width to 30 feet or 35 feet, by substituting screw propellers or stern wheels for side wheels; but with such modifications they could not be classed as "first-class steamboats."

PROJECT.

PROPOSED CHANNEL FROM LAKE PONTCHARTRAIN TO BAYOU CROCODILE.

The reverse slope of the bank of the Mississippi River at the locality of Bayou Manchac terminates at Bayou Crocodile, and the surface of the ground bordering the proposed channel from Lake Pontchartrain to the latter bayou is essentially level, admitting water throughout its extent corresponding in level (during the absence of floods) with tide-water in the lakes. It is therefore proposed to make the excavations in this portion of the channel, necessary to give it a depth at lowest water of at least seven feet, and a width of at least forty-five yards, by means of floating dredging machines, similar to those used for excavating the numerous canals through the swamps intervening between the settled portions of the city of New Orleans and Lake Pontchartrain. Excavations will be necessary at the following named localities only: The bar at the Pontchartrain end of Pass Manchac; the bar at the Mauripas end of Pass Manchac; the bar at the mouth of Amite River, cut-offs, and widenings of Amite River at eighty-three different points between its mouth and New River; the channel of Amite River, known as New River (see map where this channel is also marked as the locality of "Set No. 2" of Lieutenant Hezlep's cross sections); and Bayou Manchac from its junction with Amite River to Bayou Crocodile;

amounting to 2,518,897 cubic yards, as estimated by Lieutenant Hezlep (see his report).

BAYOU CROCODILE TO MISSISSIPPI RIVER.

That part of the proposed channel line comprised between Bayou Crocodile and the Mississippi River, is marked by so much of old Bayou Manchac as lies upon the reverse slope of the Mississippi River bank. At low water on the bayou (during absence of floods in the Amite), depths of water varying between 0 and 3 feet 6 inches are found above the mouth of Bayou Crocodile to a point 1,650 yards from it. Above this point the bayou is dry, except during seasons of floods in the Amite (when the water backs up the bayou a mile or two further), and crevasses in the Mississippi levees occurring in the vicinity (during the crevasse of 1862 it contained three feet depth of water at its head, just outside the levee). The bayou is closed (and has been, according to the reports, since the time of General Jackson), by a dam in continuation of the levee.

The bottom of the bayou at its head is thirteen feet six inches above low-water mark in the Mississippi, and floods in the latter exceeding that height would send water through the former channel-way in the absence of the dam now closing it.

It is evident, therefore, that the conditions of the case are such (see also Lieutenant Hezlep's report) that the section of the proposed channel here in question must be in all respects a canal.

And as there are no intermediate sources at higher levels whence water can be had for its service, the canal must have a single level, supplied at one end, corresponding to extreme low water, to serve for navigation at such stages of water. Furthermore, although lowest water level in the Mississippi River, as adopted in this report from observations hitherto, is two feet and three-quarters of an inch higher than extreme low water in the proposed channel-way comprised between Bayou Crocodile and Lake Pontchartrain (corresponding to low tide in the latter), the difference between the levels is liable at some time in the future to diminish. At all events, the low-water level in the river is variable, while that of tide-water is essentially constant. It will be judicious, therefore, to place the canal level at the level of low tide-water, as shown at Bayou Crocodile, establishing the canal bed at a level (continuous between this point and the river) seven feet below the tide level named. [It should be noted that the ordinary tide oscillations felt in the lakes, averaging about four-tenths of a foot (see Humphrey's and Abbott's report, page 106) are not perceptible at this point, being overcome by the wind and the long and tortuous channel intervening.] Communicating directly with this level, a lock is proposed, to be placed in the main channel near the river. As the river attains higher levels under the influence of floods, other locks corresponding to these

levels must be brought into requisition. These additional locks it is proposed to place in auxiliary side canals, communicating with the main canal at a point between the lowest lock of the flight (the one first named) and the river. The total excavation for these canals, main and auxiliary, is estimated at 6, 840,732 cubic yards.

LOCKS.

The maximum oscillations of the Mississippi River at Baton Rouge and Donaldsonville are respectively found by adding .05 feet (see table, page 109, Humphrey's and Abbott's report) to 34.3 feet, and 27 feet (see table, page 109, Humphrey's and Abbott's report), and amount to 34.8 and 27.5 feet respectively. Interpolating on the supposition that the surface planes of the river have a uniform slope between these two points, the maximum oscillation at the head of Bayou Manchac is found to be 32.98 feet. Correcting this result by information obtained from intelligent persons residing in the immediate vicinity, I have assumed, for the purposes of this report, thirty-two feet as the amount of the oscillation at the latter point. Adding two feet for difference of level between low water in the river and the canal, there results thirty-four feet for the total lift between low water in the canal and high water in the river. This lift it is proposed to overcome by four locks of nine feet lift each, thus allowing a margin of two feet for floods higher than hitherto recorded. The lowest lock, or lock No. 1, is to be placed in the main canal, as above stated. In order that the navigation may remain uninterrupted during all stages of the river, the other three locks are to be placed in three branching side canals, as illustrated by figure 3 (see map). Lock No. 1 would alone be used for all stages of the river not more than nine feet above tide-water. The river rising more than nine feet above tide-water, flood-gate No. 1 (see figure 3) is to be introduced, and lock No. 2 brought into use in connection with lock No. 1. When the flood reaches a height of 18 feet and more (referred to tide-water), flood-gate No. 2 is to be placed in position, and lock No. 3 used in connection with locks Nos. 1 and 2. For heights exceeding 27 feet, flood-gate No. 3 is to be used, and all four of the locks. Fig. 3 fully illustrates the plan proposed, and the use of the locks and flood-gates for all stages of water. The still water backing into the bayou and canal from floods in the Amite will not interfere with the working of the lock and flood-gate system.

The interior horizontal dimensions of the locks will be, as before stated, as follows: 250 feet long, 65 feet wide; their interior depth will be 18 feet, their upper and lower gates will be 18 feet high. It is proposed, for obvious reasons, to construct the locks of timber, founding them upon areas of piles, driven about six feet apart, measured on lines parallel and perpendicular to the axis of the locks.

It is proposed to construct the locks essentially like the "Vallette floating dock" (a description of which, by Lieutenant D. W. Payne, corps of engineers, is appended), since the strains to be resisted are essentially the same in the two cases. The principal modifications would consist in dispensing with the sides, ends and backheads appertaining to the dock's hold, bringing the bottom of the hold up in contact with the deck of the dock, increasing the strength of all the stanchions employed in the sides, and introducing diagonal braces.

It is estimated that each lock foundation (including the usual accessories) will require 13,000 piles, each from 20 to 35 feet in length; and that the superstructure (including the capping of the piles) will require 3,975,200 feet of timber, board measure.

FLOOD-GATES.

Owing to the loose and treacherous character of the soil and substrata to be dealt with, the establishment of flood-gates of adequate strength and stability will be an engineering problem of the greatest difficulty. Three flood-gates at least will be required, each 65 feet wide. Flood-gate No. 1 is to be 45 feet high (reaching four feet above high water), and must be able to sustain a head of water of 25 feet (deducting nine feet, the lift of lock No. 1, from 34 feet, the total maximum left). Gate No. 2 must have a height of 34 feet, and sustain a head of water of 16 feet. Flood-gate No. 3 will be 25 feet high, and must resist a head of seven feet.

Whatever the character of the gates adopted, the abutments and foundations supporting them should be of the most substantial character; and as the treacherous nature of the substrata renders the use of heavy masonry hazardous and enormously costly, it is proposed to employ timber alone (swamp cypress) for this purpose, with piles for foundations.

It is proposed to form flood-gate No. 3, and the lower section of each of the others, by means of a caisson, similar and similarly manipulated to the one used for closing the entrance of the Brooklyn navy yard dry dock, the vertical sections of which are rectangular, and the horizontal ones two equal curves joining at their ends with their convexities outwards; the caisson to be 25 feet high, so that when sunk into position, the top shall be seven feet higher than the top of the corresponding lock. The remaining 18 or 20 feet of gate No. 1, and 9 or 11 feet of gate No. 2, it is proposed to form by means of several open-built beams, having an outline corresponding to the horizontal section of the caissons interposed flatwise on the latter and on one another. The caissons to be floated and sunk into position, where they will rest on the foundation at the bottom of the canal and against the abutments. The beams to be superposed as the river rises by means of derricks or cranes, established on top of the abutments, and placed also with their ends resting against the abutments, where

the pressure of the water will retain them, their flotation being neutralized by adequate weights placed on the uppermost one. The average number of piles estimated for the flood-gates is 300 each.

ESTIMATES.

SURVEY.

For finally locating and laying out the entire work..... \$10,000 00

CLEARING GROUNDS READY FOR WORK.

For felling trees on space occupied by the channel, and on space
20 yards wide, on either side, 900 acres, at \$5 per acre..... 4,500 00
Clearing drift-wood out of Bayou Manchac, 8 miles, at \$200 per
mile..... 1,600 00

EXCAVATIONS.

Bars in Lakes Pontchartrain and Mauripas, Amite River, and
Bayou Manchac, between Lake Mauripas and Bayou Crocodile,
2,578,897 cubic yards, at 25 cents per yard..... 629,724 25
Canal and side canals between Bayou Crocodile and Mississippi
River, 6,840,732 cubic yards, at 30 cents per yard..... 2,052,219 60

LOCKS.

For each lock, 13,000 piles, purchased, prepared, driven, and trim-
med ready for the reception of the timber of the superstructure,
are estimated to cost \$7 each, amounting to..... 91,000 00
For the superstructure (including capping of piles and gates),
3,975,200 feet, board measure, of timber, purchased, delivered,
framed, and built into the lock (including all carpenter and
joiner work), is estimated to cost 4 cents per foot, amounting to 159,008 00
4 locks, at 250,008 each..... 1,000,032 00

FLOOD GATES.

For 3 flood-gates, 900 piles, driven and completed, at \$7 each,
(\$6,300); 21,600 feet, board measure, of sheet piling (plank 12
feet long and 4 inches thick), at 4 cents per foot (\$864); 3 cais-
sons containing 175,500 feet, board measure, of timber, carpenter,
joiner, caulker, iron, and painters' work, included, at 4½ cents
per foot (\$7,897 50); grillage complete, 26,000 feet, board meas-
ure, of timber, at 4 cents per foot (\$10,400); 6 abutments com-
plete—2 of them 45 feet high, 2 of them 36 feet high, and 2 of
them 27 feet high—total height of 216 feet, containing 1,101,600
feet, board measure (facing, backing, and ties), at four cents
per foot (\$44,064), and open built beams complete, forming the
portion of flood-gates Nos. 1 and 2, superposed in the caissons
for the total height of 31 feet, 63,180 feet, board measure, at
4½ cents per foot (\$2,843); aggregate cost ready for use..... 72,368 06

AUXILIARY MACHINERY.

Machinery for manipulating and handling lock-gates and flood-
gates, estimated..... 30,000 00

Grand Aggregate.....\$3,500,444 45

The above estimates are very close, and are more likely to prove too small than too great, especially those relating to the excavations. The very lowest rates at which ordinary levee embankments can now be made, in this vicinity, is 33 cents per yard, although the embankments and corresponding excavations whence

the earth is taken, are in very near proximity, and the soil to be dealt with, quite dry. Much of the proposed canal excavation will require the earth to be elevated through considerable heights, and transported over considerable distance, and much difficulty will arise from the presence of water in the lower portions of the excavation.

Of all the channel ways forming connection, or partial connection, between the Mississippi River and the lake and sound, the one proposed is least favorable, in all respects, for extension and improvement as proposed. On account of the greater oscillations of the Mississippi river, and the greater width of the reverse slope of the river bank at the point of junction, and the greater length to be improved, the cost, both of its improvement and preservation, will be vastly greater than many other and much preferable lines that are available, and the liability to accidents leading to interruptions of navigation, and even the destruction of the work, far more imminent. The channel proposed, when completed ready for navigation, will be less useful and convenient than many others that might be selected, since it will present about 75 miles of intricate navigation between the river and Lake Pontchartrain, which cannot be accomplished at a speed exceeding 5 miles per hour, the whole time required for the passage, including locking, being about 16 hours.

A canal connecting the lake directly with the river, at almost any point between Bonnet Carré Bend and the city of New Orleans, would, in all respects, be preferable. (See map marked B.) At several such points the canal would not exceed 6 miles in length, and for more than half this length the depth of the excavation would not exceed 9 feet.

Were it a question of merely connecting the river with Mississippi Sound and its branches and inlets, a canal connecting the river with Lake Borgne, between the Chalmette line of fortifications and English Turn (see map B), would be still more advantageous and feasible in all respects. There are at least two bayous heading within three miles of the river, and affording seven to sixteen feet of water thence to Lake Borgne, which latter affords eight to ten feet of water from the bars at the Bayou mouths to the sound.

As an example of these several preferable connections, I caused to be made a survey of the line connecting the river, at a point about midway between Carrollton and Camp Parapet, with "the new canal" at a point near Metairie Ridge (Bayou Metairie, see map marked C), with estimates of the cost of completing the entire connection between the river and the lake according to the requirements specified, viz: width 45 yards, depth of water 7 feet, and suitable locks and flood-gates.

The difference of level between high water in the river and low tide in the lake, is about 17 feet (see Humphrey's and Abbott's report, pp. 109, 113, and 170), and but two locks and one flood-gate will, therefore, be required.

ESTIMATE.

SURVEY.

Laying out and marking the work..... \$3,000 00

CLEARING GROUND.

Clearing trees from 30 acres of ground, at \$5 per acre..... 150 00

EXCAVATION.

1,030,344 cubic yards of excavation, at 25 cents per yard..... 257,586 00

LOCKS.

2 locks complete, at \$250,008 each..... 500,016 00

FLOOD-GATES.

For one flood-gate complete (including foundation, abutments and the caisson)..... 19,187 16

AUXILIARY MACHINERY.

Machinery for manipulating locks, gates and flood-gates, estimated 6,000 00

\$785,939 16

The "new canal" is at present about 60 feet wide, and has 6 feet of water, and terminates at the "new basin," a little less than one mile from the river. It is owned by the State of Louisiana (having lately reverted to it), and is leased to private parties for a term of years, one of the terms of the lease requiring that the lessees widen and deepen the canal. Some progress has been made in widening it to 100 feet, and deepening it to about 9 feet. To remove the cypress stumps requires the excavation to be 9 feet deep in the first instance. After the removal of these, which is usually done with Osgood's excavator, there is no difficulty in obtaining, say, 16 feet depth with the same machine. All similar excavations in the swamps bordering the lakes and the low ground bordering the river, are made by this machine. It is set up on a scow, which floats in the water with which the excavations fill as fast as they are made.

Supposing the proposed connection to be made at any point below Bonnet Carré Bend, the locks and flood-gates could be entirely dispensed with by terminating the canal at a point, say, 45 yards from the crest of the levee or river bank, and providing facilities, say cranes, or platforms on wheels, worked by steam, for transferring freights rapidly between boats in the two waters. By this arrangement, any boats or vessels now on the river, and the shallow tide-water of the lakes and sound, or which may be hereafter introduced, could be brought to the point of transfer and exchange cargoes.

The great cost and risk attending any device for connecting the waters of the Mississippi River continuously with those of the lakes would also, by this arrangement, be avoided.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. D. McALESTER,

Brevet Brigadier General, Major of Engineers.

Brevet Major General A. A. HUMPHREYS,

Brigadier General and Chief of Engineers, Washington, D. C.

NEW ORLEANS, LA., July 31, 1867.

Sir—In compliance with your letters of instructions, dated New Orleans, Louisiana, April 22 and 29, and May 8, I have the honor to report that I proceeded with a surveying party to Bayou Manchac, on the 24th day of April, and made an examination and survey of that bayou, the Amite River, and of the bars at the mouth of Amite River, and at the east and west ends of Pass Manchac.

The object of the survey being to ascertain, as near as practicable, the amount of excavation necessary, in order to render the streams mentioned navigable for steamers of the first class (those of the Morgan line, between this city and Mobile, being taken as a standard), it was assumed that the channel should be at least 45 yards wide at the bottom, with a depth of 7 feet, the banks having a slope of one in one; and the calculations which follow are based upon this assumption.

Cross sections of the bayou were taken every fifty yards. The "0" of vertical measurement being taken at low water at the section, unless the channel is dry at low water; horizontal measurements in yards, vertical in feet.

The sections were arranged in five sets, each set of sections being continuous; set No. 1, extending from the Mississippi River to the Amite River; set No. 2, covering that portion of the Amite known as New River; set No. 3, the bar at the mouth of the Amite River; sets Nos. 4 and 5, the bars at the east and west ends of Pass Manchac, respectively. The sets and sections were numbered from the Mississippi eastwardly.

The work progressed favorably, and was finished on the 20th of May, 1867. The water being high, and the current rapid, in the Amite River, in consequence of the spring flood, some of the measurements given relating to that river, are necessarily inaccurate, but the errors are small, and, it is thought, compensating.

The bayou, for a distance of eight miles from the Mississippi River (to Bayou Crocodile), is filled with logs, growing trees, and undergrowth, and is dry at low water to within a mile of this point. To the Crocodile it has an average width of about twenty yards; from this point to Ward's Creek, it has an average width of thirty yards; but it is obstructed by falling and leaning trees, logs, etc. From Ward's Creek to the Amite, it has been cleaned out, and is navigated by a small steamer, there being a depth of seven feet nearly all the way up at low water.

At low water, the current in the Manchac is dependent entirely upon the wind, high easterly winds backing the waters up the Amite, causing it to flow up the Manchac.

The Manchac has three tributaries, which carry into it the drainage of a large portion of the country extending from Baton Rouge, above, down to New River Landing, below. Of these, the Crocodile is the most important, being the outlet of Spanish Lake, which receives all the drainage from Bayous Paul and Brand. It

is, at high water, about twenty-five yards wide at the water surface; at low water it is dry, for part of its length. The next inlet is Bayou Fountain, which drains a large portion of the high land, and the land between Baton Rouge and the head of the Manchac. Along the river, Ward's Creek is the last stream of any importance which flows into the Manchac, and it, at low water, discharges but little water. None of these tributaries are high enough to supply reservoirs to feed the canal proposed.

At the junction of the Manchac with the Amite River, a bar has formed some twenty yards wide, and extending down the river for fifty yards. There are but three feet of water on this bar when the river is at its lowest stage. From this point down to what is known as New River, and from New River to Lake Mauripas, the Amite River is generally over forty-five yards wide, and from twelve to twenty-five feet deep at low water. New River is of an average width of thirty-eight yards, and is very crooked and deep.

The Bayou Manchac and Amite River are bordered throughout their whole length by heavy forests, with the exception of a few plantations and landings. In many places the trees overhang the bank, both of the river and the bayou, so as to render navigation difficult and dangerous, even for small steamboats. In the highlands are found pine, ash, and oak; in the swamps, cypress, gum, water oak, etc.

The soil along the Manchac is a stiff clay, growing firmer as you leave the Mississippi River, the coarser materials being deposited near the Mississippi bank. The banks of the Manchac have a reverse slope, similar to that of the Mississippi, there being, however, a greater fall in the same distance. Along the Mississippi, the average reverse slope of the natural bank, is about seven feet in the first mile, while along the bayou the average reverse slope is about *three* feet in the first hundred yards. At the mouth of the Manchac the soil becomes mixed with sand, but the proportion is small, and does not, in any way, obstruct the channel, by forming bars; and, in fact, at the points where shallow water could be expected, the banks, are, in places, from twelve to fifteen feet high, and stand almost perpendicular.

The high water of the spring backs up the Manchac so as to give, in many places below Bayou Crocodile, a depth of twenty feet and over, overflowing a large portion of the country on the south side; and, falling rapidly, a very rapid current is formed, rendering navigation extremely difficult.

The slope back from the Mississippi, along the Manchac, is most rapid for the first two miles, when it becomes more gradual. In order to make the estimate of the excavation more accurate, avoiding the error of assuming the slope from the Mississippi to the Crocodile as uniform, a line of levels was run from the head of the Manchac to its junction with the Crocodile, and the following results obtained:

Difference of level of natural bank of Mississippi, in first two

miles and a half, is eight feet five inches; between this point and the Crocodile (when the direction of current, at low water, is dependent entirely upon the direction of the wind, and the rise and fall of the Amite), eleven feet three inches; making a total of nineteen feet eight inches.

Difference of level between extreme high water in Mississippi of 1862, and extreme low water in the bayou at the Crocodile, thirty-four feet and three-fourths of an inch. The extreme fall of the Mississippi River being thirty-two feet, nearly, this gives the difference of level between low water in the Mississippi and in the Manchac at two feet and three-fourths of an inch.

As there is no body of water near the Manchac which can be used as a reservoir to supply locks for different levels in the canal, it must be excavated down low enough to give the required draught of seven feet at low water, which places the bottom of the canal nine feet below the low water line of the Mississippi River, or thirty-seven feet seven inches below the natural bank of the Mississippi, at the crest of the channel bank.

To overcome this rise, at least four locks will be required placed in four different side canals, a project for which is appended.

AMOUNT OF EXCAVATION REQUIRED, AND THE ESTIMATE OF THE COST OF THE SAME.

*From Mississippi River to Bayou Crocodile, 6,295,394 cubic yards, at 30 cents per yard.....	\$1,888,618 20
Side canals for locks, 545,338 cubic yards, at 30 cents per yard..	163,601 40
*From Bayou Crocodile to Amite River, 1,903,520 cubic yards, at 25 cents per yard.....	475,880 00
New River, 96,785 cubic yards, at 25 cents per yard.....	24,195 75
Points of Amite River, 464,000 cubic yards, at 25 cents per yard	116,000 00
Bar at mouth of Amite, 9,668 cubic yards, at 25 cent per yard..	2,417 00
Bar at west end of Pass Manchac, 24,077 cubic yards, at 25 cents per yard.....	6,019 25
Bar at east end of Pass Manchac, 20,849 cubic yards, at 25 cents per yard.....	5,212 25
	<hr/>
	\$2,681,943 85

TIMBER AND LUMBER FOR ONE LOCK.

13,000 piles, 20 feet to 35 feet long, 1 foot in diameter, at
3,125,200 feet of 12-inch by 12-inch timber, board measure, at
600,000 3-inch plank for sheeting and gates, at
250,000 12-inch by 12-inch timber, gates, at

The cost of a project for opening a canal from near Camp Parapet, on the Mississippi River, just above Carrollton, to the point near the Metairie Ridge, where the new canal crosses it, and of widening and deepening the new canal from that point to Lake Pontchartrain, is as follows:

* In all cases where the canal follows the existing natural channel-way, the cubature of the latter is deducted in estimating the excavation for the canal.

	Cubic yards.
For canal 300 yards long, 17 feet 1 inch deep, and 24 yards wide, for lock at low water.....	50,820
For canal 200 yards long, 9 feet 4 inches deep and 24 yards wide, for lock at high water.....	16,874
For canal from Camp Parapet to foot of slope, 1½ mile, 45 yards wide, and from 17 feet 1 inch to 8 feet 6 inches deep.....	560,340
For canal from foot of slope to New Canal, at Metairie Ridge, 45 yards by 8 feet 6 inches, and widening and deepening New Canal, thence to Lake Pontchartrain.....	402,310
	<hr/> 1,030,344 <hr/>
1,030,344 cubic yards of excavation, at 25 cents per yard.....	\$257,586

In opening either of these canals, an item of some importance must be considered—the deposit in the lakes of the sediment from the Mississippi River. This will be constantly going on, and will be accompanied with considerable expense.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. K. HEZLER,

First Lieutenant, Corps of Engineers.

Brevet Brigadier General M. D. McALESTER,

Corps of Engineers.

ART. X—BLUNDERS OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT.

(Continued.)

3—MILITARY ADMINISTRATION.

At the birth of the Confederacy, no man could deny that it might soon need its whole military strength for its defence. A real statesman, surveying the political horizon by the light of history, must have foreseen that a great struggle was at hand. When has a powerful government ever allowed its frontier to be thrust back, and its authority cast out, from broad and rich territories, while it could yet hope to maintain its jurisdiction by the sword? Until he could quote one such example, no man could point out even the shadow of ground on which to build his hopes of peace. Moreover, it should have been obvious to those who had charged themselves with the destinies of a people just launched into independent national existence, that, even if it had not been born with a quarrel on its hands, its safety among the older and armed powers of the earth, required a thorough organization of its military resources.

The safety, the very existence of the Confederacy was based, not on any acknowledgments of its rights, for these were absolutely denied, but solely on its ability and readiness to defend them. Threatened by a powerful and insolent enemy, it stood

alone, without friend or ally, with the prejudice of the world arrayed against it. It needed for its defence, not merely an army, but a military system which might, when needed, meet the requisitions of a long and arduous war, with the least possible exhaustion to the country; for it sometimes happens that a country is in such peril of being overrun and crushed by powerful neighbors, that it needs the organization and erection of every resource, that can be made available in war, to defend it, and maintain the national existence.

In this case the all-important question is, What is the utmost military strength of the country, and how can it be developed? how its powers of resisting and repelling the assaults of the enemy, of enduring the evils and repairing the losses incident to war, can be brought into action, so as to give the country the best chance of passing successfully through the struggle?

In a primitive state of society, the solution of this question is not difficult. When the forest domain of a Gothic tribe, or the steppes of a Tartar horde, which gave pasturage to their herds, were invaded by neighbors, perhaps rude and unsettled as themselves, the women, children and cattle were hurried from the frontier, while every adult male of the community assembled in arms to drive back the invaders. Or, perhaps, yielding to the pressure of the hostile columns, they lightly abandoned the territory they roamed over rather than cultivated, and the whole State, often a confederation of many tribes, organizing itself into an invading army, the women, children and cattle bringing up the rear, precipitated itself on other neighbors, often on the cultivated fields of civilization, to reap a rich harvest which they had not sown, and to conquer a home more attractive than the rude domain on which they had turned their backs. Although numberless of these enterprises failed, yet to such migrations of a nation in arms, almost every State in Europe, and many in Asia and elsewhere, can be traced.

In this primitive state of society, the military power of a people was as great for offensive as defensive war. Great and sudden catastrophies were consequently common among nations. Wars were usually short. Often, the consequences of a single campaign, sometimes of a single battle, terminated the national existence of a people; the slaughter of the battle-field and the horrors of famine sweeping off men, women and children by myriads. The survivors became incorporated, on various footings, into the ranks of more prosperous communities, and the name of that people is henceforth found only on the pages of history.

But as nations become more civilized, the solution of the problem how to organize the resources of the country, so as to develop its utmost military energy, becomes more difficult. It varies with every phase of civilization, and with the conditions of each climate, country and people. Moreover, in the case of every civil-

ized nation, it will be found that its resources are far greater for defensive than offensive war—a fact which happily tends to prolong and secure the independent existence of civilized communities.

As a people become more civilized, their means of living depend less on the spontaneous gifts of nature, and more on the results of systematic labor and on capital, that is, accumulated labor vested in some permanent shape, and now become necessary to the well-being of the people. Its military power, too, rests chiefly on the same foundation. The denser population incident to civilization can only be fed by the assiduous cultivation of the soil. This demands much skill and unremitting toil. Nor is food the only necessary of life, nor is the whole nation occupied in growing food. A large portion obtain their bread only by exchanging for it the productions of their labor in some art, or of their services in some calling, and have no other means of living. Again, the transportation of food and other necessities to the points of consumption, and the distribution of them, require additional agents and more labor still.

It is evidently during a state of war that the resources of a country are most heavily taxed. At times, everything that can be spared from the necessities of life to the people, must go to maintain the war. But, however urgent the necessity of defending the country, there is one necessity more urgent still—that of feeding it. The government and the army produce nothing. Yet they must be fed, as well as the rest of the nation, with the women and children, who give permanence to the national existence; or mere military success would be temporary and valueless.

Now, the direct effect of war is to diminish the food of the country, not only by withdrawing manual labor and animal power from its production, but by the devastation of provinces which are the scenes of military operations, and often by the destruction of magazines to prevent their falling into the enemy's hands. Nor is food the only necessary of life that is thus diminished; and the army, moreover, is a vast consumer of productions necessary to keep up its equipment and powers of action.

A modern army, moreover, cannot be created in a day; and its efficiency depends far less on mere armed numbers, hastily assembled, than on the steady supply of food and other necessities, and of the equipments and costly material needed, and rapidly consumed, in military operations. Without a steady supply of these, it is impossible to maintain its organization, discipline and powers of prompt action. It becomes demoralized by destitution, and its numbers dwindle away from disease and desertion.

A modern war is seldom ended in a campaign. The extensive territory held by most modern nations; the cumbrous nature of the materials of war; the necessity of establishing magazines and transporting the supplies of an army; the facilities which modern arms, fortresses and entrenched positions, afford for delaying the

progress of an enemy, usually lengthen out the war, and convert it from a short trial of strength into a prolonged struggle, to be decided by the endurance and the resources of the contending parties, which often last for years.

Thus the maintenance of an army in the field presupposes the existence at home of a laboring and producing community, whose unceasing exertions provide the means of keeping that army in an effective condition.

The larger the draft on the male population for service on the frontier, the greater the demand on the industrial resources of the country, and the greater the necessity of maintaining the frame and order of civil society. Numerous individuals of the worst classes will strive, often successfully, to avoid military service—many perhaps unfit or exempt from it—others deserting from it. It will be a period of unusual distress and privations, strong stimulants to depredation and crime; and there will be urgent need of ample provision for the civil police of the country, and for the administration of justice. Thus, the necessity for increased military effort is accompanied by an increased need of productive labor and internal police.

When a people possess numerous slaves, and especially when those slaves are chiefly employed in the production of food, a larger proportion of the free men can be maintained in military service. Yet, however numerous these slaves may be, the whole free adult male population can never be available for the army. The results of labor depend largely on the skill and energy that direct and control it; and slave labor especially needs capable and energetic agents to make it available and productive.

Were any civilized nation in Europe to emulate the conduct of its Gothic ancestors, organize its whole adult male population into an army, interrupt its productive labors, apply all its means of transportation to military purposes, in order to attack its neighbors, the national ruin the invading host would leave behind it, would be more certain and complete than that which marked the progress of its arms.

Enough has been said to show that the maximum of the military power of a civilized nation is not developed by organizing into an army all who are able to bear arms. It is so impossible to keep up the efficiency, or even the numbers, of an army, without adequate and costly provision for its wants, that we are convinced that any civilized nation numbering millions, and occupying a wide territory, will be better defended by applying all its resources to maintaining under arms, less than half of those capable of bearing arms, than the whole; and, in offensive war, its resources would be better expended on less than one-fourth. Indeed, we believe that in both cases, we overrate the most efficient proportions. The attempt to do more would only decrease the efficiency of its armies, and be soon followed by an utter exhaustion of the resources of the country, a prostration of its

energies, and a wreck of social order, imperilling the independence and existence of the nation.

It is difficult to ascertain the maximum of the military power of any country. We will, hereafter, inquire whether those who occupied the posts of statesmen in the Confederacy, solved the problem there.

For it is ever the part of statesmen to decide, after weighing the resources of the country, its foreign relations, and its internal condition, what amount of armed force must be put and kept on foot, and what material of war held in readiness for its defence, and what mode of making this provision for the national safety is best suited to the conditions and institutions of the country. On these points a wise statesman will always consult able military and naval officers, and allow great weight to their opinions; but the responsibility of adopting an efficient military system, harmonizing with the institutions of the country, rests with the statesman alone.

It must be remembered that the people of the Southern States were not making, but opposing a revolution. They were strongly attached to the institutions under which they had lived, and had no wish to change them. They had found no fault with the constitutional compact under which they had entered the Federal Union. They were but too well satisfied with what we believe to have been an objectionable treaty; for they adopted a servile copy of it as the Constitution of the new Confederacy. The sole object of the movements, on which the seceding States had entered, was to rid themselves of all connection with those faithless and usurping associates, who had long and persistently violated the most essential terms of that compact which bound the States to each other; a compact, now, through the gross violation of its terms, no longer binding on the injured parties.

The statesmen of the Confederacy in preparing it for the defence of its rights, had laws, institutions, and the habits and convictions of the people to guide them, and were bound to exhaust the resources these afforded, before resorting to revolutionary measures. Indeed, these long recognized institutions, the taxing power in the government, and the well defined liability to military service in the citizen, afforded the legitimate, undisputed, means of exhausting the resources of the country in its defense.

The raising of regular armies of hireling soldiers, or rather, recruiting the standing army, which, until the close of the last century, was, and in a measure still is, the ordinary resource of modern and civilized governments, when involved in war, afforded here a limited resource. The Confederacy had no standing army; and could not possibly raise one adequate to the emergency. The English notions and feelings as to a standing army, and the hireling soldier, had not only been brought over to this country, but had become aggravated here. The necessity of keeping up a small force of professional soldiers, for garrison, and ordnance,

and kindred duties, was acknowledged; but, public opinion tolerated nothing more. High as the military spirit of the people was, a strong aversion to sinking the citizen in the soldier, was almost universal among them. Few native recruits, and those of a very inferior class, could be induced, even by high bounties, to adopt, as hirelings, the trade of war. Recruiting, when tried, was successful chiefly among foreigners, and there was not one foreigner in the South to ten in the North, even previous to the great importation, during the war, of foreign recruits by hundreds of thousands. (We appeal for proofs to the census and immigration reports.) Nor indeed would such new raised regular troops possess at once any superiority over volunteers, or drafts from the militia. Consisting almost exclusively of an inferior class, they would be wanting in the spirit and intelligence of volunteers, they would be wanting too in that patriotic devotion to the country and the cause, to be found even in an unselected body of militia. Being newly raised, they would be destitute of the peculiar merits of regulars; long training in the duties and sentiments of the soldier. Still, the Confederate government stood in need of some regular troops for certain services; was right to endeavor to raise them; but not to rely on them as the chief defence of the country. On the first outbreak of hostilities, volunteer corps were the natural and obvious resource; the more so, as many of the corps were already, and had long been, organized as a part of the militia.

What is the militia? In a war like this on which the Confederacy was entering, every citizen, according to his ability, is under equal obligation to aid in the defence of the country. But, even among the most warlike and patriotic people, there are many who will shirk all duty, and leave it to others to bear "the burden and heat of the day." But military service was not a duty which the citizen might assume or not, at will. The militia, and the obligation to serve in its ranks, was a well understood part of the institutions of the people, older than the States or the Colonies, being of Anglo-Saxon origin, like the people themselves. It is true, that the organization known as the militia, taken as a whole, was, and must always be, as a military body, incomplete and inefficient. Not only does it need re-organizing after a long peace; but it is impossible to turn the whole able-bodied male population into an army. The maintenance of such army is impossible in any country, for its resources are annihilated in the attempt. The purpose which the militia truly serves, is to furnish the reservoir out of which should be drawn, by a process not subversive of the character of the citizen, the active force for the defence of the country. As trial by jury has for its object not merely the administration of justice, but also the security of liberty and rights, so the military organization of the citizens, as the militia, and the right to keep and bear arms, aimed equally at the defence of the country against foreign enemies, and the security of the citizen against usurpations of their own government,

should it encroach on their rights. Moreover, the reserved right of the States, each to officer and train its own militia, according to the regulations to be uniformly prescribed for all, by the Federal or Confederate government, was an essential part of the great charter of liberty, the chief security against the usurpation and concentration of all power into the hands of the common agent of the States.

There was, thus, a military system, and an organization dictated by the conditions and institutions of the country. The mode and manner of "conscription" was prescribed, not only by the Constitution, but by the long inherited institutions of the people, and the Confederate government had actually to go out of its way to avoid adopting it.

While availing itself of the volunteer force, which rushed to arms at the first call, the Confederate government, making the best use of the established institutions of the country, using the tools presented to its hands, and calling things by the names by which they were universally known to the people (for names are things), should have lost no time in requiring and enforcing a complete registration of the militia. According to the exigencies of the war, a portion, whether one-tenth, or fifth, or third, should have been called into service, for not less than a year. The organization of that portion remaining at home, should meanwhile have been carefully kept up, partly to meet local emergencies, but yet, more in order that drafts should be made on volunteers received from each regiment, at intervals of a few months, to supply the losses of the detachments on active service, or to fill the place of those whose term of service had expired. These frequent drafts effecting every man liable to serve, in inverse proportion to the fullness and completeness of the enrollment, would have stimulated many in every part of the country, to insist that the registration should be kept complete, and the militia organization fully maintained in each locality. It would have become a standing reality embodying the personal of the military resources of the country. From the zeal and high spirit of the people, the earlier quotas would be filled by volunteers, but, if the war were prolonged, the time must necessarily come when drafts would be the chief resource.

As each regiment and brigade of the militia embraces a well-defined region of country, in its recruiting district, and as every regiment in the field would consist of detachments of volunteers or drafted men from certain contiguous regiments of militia at home, it would have a distinctly marked territory from which to recruit its ranks. This would enable the government to ascertain at once in what localities the duties of military service were shunned, and to take measures to equalize the burden of the defence of the country.

This system of recruiting puts it much in the power of the officers of each corps in the field to keep its ranks full, as they

know where their recruits are to come from; and it raises the greatest obstacle to desertion, as the deserter cannot return home without detection. His officers, themselves from the same part of the country, would almost always know where to find him. Nor can he remain elsewhere, as an unknown man, without vouchers for his character and position, without exposing himself to suspicion and examination as a deserter, or possibly an alien enemy.

After the levy of the first quota from the militia, whether by volunteering or drafting, the system of frequent drafts would provide against any corps in the field consisting altogether of new recruits, as the ranks would be refilled and all losses replaced several times before the first quota had served out its term. Nor would the ranks be thinned by the necessity of giving furloughs during so short a period of service as one year. All those who had fulfilled their term, yet were willing to continue in service, as many officers and some privates would wish to do, should be retained, and, if possible, with higher rank than that which they had held. Consequently, fewer officers should be included in the next draft, while appointments and promotions should be suspended in the militia regiments at home, as long as the number of officers there exceeded a due proportion to the men.

The volunteer regiments, suddenly raised on the first outbreak of the war, need not have stood in the way of these arrangements. The officers of those first raised had been commissioned by the Governors of some of the States, and each had been levied chiefly in some particular part of the country. Nature and the circumstances of their origin pointed out the sources from which their strength should be kept up. Had care been taken to preserve to them the character of State organizations, each of them might have been allotted a definite portion of the region in which it had been chiefly raised, as its recruiting district, and the quota of recruits raised there from time to time should be accompanied by not more than half its complement of officers, so that the commissions would be held chiefly by those whose experience and services had already tested their fitness for command. We would not, then, have seen most of the best regiments—those made up of choice materials, and which had done best service—killed off early in the war, and tried and approved officers thrown out of service, or reduced to the command of a corporal's guard, for want of any provision for recruiting their corps. Some special corps might have been needed for special services, and be recruited from volunteers at large; but the system proposed should have been applied to the bulk of the army, and especially the infantry, and thus provide a compulsory mode, indisputably legal, of recruiting their ranks.

Trained up, as the people had been, in the conviction that it was at once the duty and the right of every citizen, unless especially exempted by his profession or other cause, to serve in the

militia of his State—accustomed to occasional drafts for some particular service and short term (while, indeed, these drafts were usually rendered needless by the required quota being filled up by volunteers)—jealous of any inequality in the burden of public service, and of exemptions which wealth and influence can often obtain, by procuring special employments incompatible with military service—this mode of organizing the public force lay naturally in the way of the Confederate government, removed many obstacles out of its path and many causes of heartburn from among the people.

It may be said that, with their impulsive character and independent habits, the men of the South would not, at the beginning of the war, have tolerated these restrictions—that they claimed and exercised the right to volunteer in whatever corps and arm of service they chose. There was, however, no occasion to restrict this liberty; but whenever a man, liable to serve, neglected to exercise the right of choice, the government would choose for him.

The crying evil of the Confederate military system, if the government can be said to have adopted one, until, through its own want of foresight it was driven to the sudden adoption of its "conscription," was this: The volunteer force which sprung into service at the first call, was made up chiefly of the best materials not only for soldiers, but officers, that the country afforded. An undue proportion of the best intelligence, spirit and patriotism of the country was enrolled there. The bulk of those who were best qualified, by position, education and character, to hold commissions in any future army that was to bring out the military strength of the country, were to be found in the rank and file of the volunteer regiments, and the greater part of it perished there. Through a fatal incapacity for military administration, the bulk of the natural officers of the Southern army, were early cut off in private or subordinate positions. These same men, distributed among the whole force afterwards organized for service, and rising to positions by nature theirs, would not have died in vain.

The militia system, well used, would have given the government command of as large a force as the country could possibly maintain in the field, and left the residue free for the vocations of civil life which are necessary to the existence of the community, and yet in a state of partial readiness to meet local emergencies; for they would be organized under officers, some at least of whom, when the war had continued a year, would have seen real service on the frontier. Such measures of preparation would have afforded some protection to every part of the country, and might have cut short many of those Yankee "raids" of robbery and devastation which characterized the latter phases of the war.

But perhaps we dwell too long on the inquiry, What military system was suggested by the condition and institutions of the

States that formed the Confederacy? Let us inquire what measures were adopted for its defence.

The first military preparations were made by individual States. Besides receiving into their service volunteer corps of all arms, some States proceeded to raise regular troops. South Carolina raised two regiments and a battalion; Georgia raised two regiments; Louisiana, we believe, and perhaps some other States took similar steps.

As States seceded one after another, most of the officers of the army and navy, who were natives of the seceding States, threw up their commissions and came home. It was as citizens of South Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana, or some other State, that they had entered the Federal service, and they recognized their ultimate allegiance as due to their own States. The rank and file of the army and navy were chiefly of Northern or foreign birth, and the handful of Southern men enlisted in the United States service were bound to it for a term of years, and had not the privilege which military policy has found it expedient to give to officers, of resigning from the service of a government which they can no longer trust, or which distrusts them. These gentlemen were gladly welcomed and employed by the State, and afterwards by the Confederate government. A few officers of Northern birth followed their example, being either domiciled in the South, or disgusted at the course of the Northern people.

About the end of February, 1861, the Confederate Congress passed an act to raise "provisional forces," authorizing the President "to receive into the service of the Confederacy such forces "as may now be in the service of the States, as may be tendered, "or may volunteer by consent of the State, in such numbers as "he may require, for any time not less than twelve months." The President was also authorized "to receive from the several "States the arms and munitions of war which have been acquired "from the United States, and all other arms and munitions which "they may desire to turn over and make chargeable to this government."

The act further provided that these forces might be received with their officers, by companies, battalions or regiments, and when so received, should form part of the "provisional army" of the Confederate States, according to the terms of their enlistment; and that the President should appoint, with the advice and consent of Congress, such general officers for these forces as may be necessary.

Soon after this (about the 10th of March), an act was passed to raise and organize the regular "army of the Confederate States," to consist of a corps of engineers, forty companies of artillerists, six regiments of infantry and one regiment of cavalry, in all about 10,000 men. The President at once appointed a number of officers from those who had resigned from the United States army, and ordered them on the recruiting service.

But the Confederacy embraced but a small portion of those classes of population among whom recruiting for the regular army is usually most successful. It was found that the States had already gathered the harvest of this small field, and left but the gleanings. A few batteries of artillery were organized, but we believe the ranks of no infantry regiment were filled. Officers who had collected a few recruits turned them over to others more successful, and found for themselves place and promotion in volunteer regiments, or were appointed by the President to important positions in the provisional army. The few regular regiments raised by the States were gradually turned over to the Confederate service. Meanwhile, volunteer corps were springing up faster than they were called for, and it was at once evident that the government would have to rely on the provisional army to carry the Confederacy through the war.

Any one who made himself familiar with the composition of the volunteer regiments, must have at once discovered that many, perhaps most of them, were made up of materials too choice to be thrust forward to bear the whole brunt of the war. For this no instant remedy could be found. But the evil would be greatly and not slowly modified by a recruiting system that more closely linked the volunteering spirit with constitutional organization of the whole public force.

The great want of the Confederate army was officers. The officers of the old army were few. They were employed to the utmost of their capacity, and beyond it. Most of them were indeed qualified for responsible, and not a few for important positions. But high military capacity is the gift of nature, and can only be improved, not created, by education. Few examples of it can be found among any small body of men, even those who had been bred at West Point.

Now the ranks of the first volunteer regiments were especially full, not only of patriotism, but of honorable military aspirations. Numberless men of position, character, education and energy had entered their ranks as privates, or in subordinate positions, with the ultimate hope of returning, after a year's experience in active service, to the neighborhood in which they were known and valued, to take a more prominent part in new organizations for the defence of the country. The conscript act, while it disgusted and alarmed the country as a startling innovation, effectually cut off many a well-founded aspiration of this kind. The mortality in the volunteer regiments in the subsequent campaigns, among those who, by character, education and military experience, were best fitted for commands, was so great, that towards the end of the war, it was exceedingly difficult to furnish the conscripts with officers fit to lead them.

We need not refer particularly to many of the earlier military acts of the Confederate Congress. They were too much the result of local and temporary emergencies, of fluctuating and discordant views, and too disjointed, to constitute a real military system.

A people may be pardoned for being led by impulse, but we demand that a government be guided by forethought; and that it weigh, not only probable contingencies, but all contingencies that are not actually improbable, before adopting or rejecting measures on which the fate of the country may hang. It is the part of a wise man, and more especially of a statesman who professes to be wise for his country, to look back to what has been, in order to anticipate what may and probably will be.

A great general has left it on record that, when the first shot is fired, no man can tell when or where the war will end. Military prudence dictates careful provision for every possible contingency in war. But the Confederate government, as well as the people, seem to have been controlled altogether by their hopes. Secession was a peaceable remedy for their wrongs, and they trusted that it would not lead to a breach of the peace. There was much to countenance this hope, yet to every cool-minded man the preservation of peace would have contradicted all recorded history, in parallel cases. The war was begun, and then both government and people anticipated a short, successful war. Time and events gliding on, they looked hopefully for divisions at the North, and foreign intervention. Successful in their first efforts of defence, they began to repose on their laurels.

The very facility with which the Confederacy at first obtained a military force by calling for volunteers, seems to have deprived it of all caution. The President called on each State for so many thousand men, and so many, and more, volunteers answered the call. The utter failure of the first Northern army to keep the field before a comparatively small Southern force, led them to despise their enemies, and confide in the resources at their own command.

Meanwhile, McClellan was perfecting the discipline of his army, vast in numbers, perfect in equipment, and confident in their strength, but waiting for the day when the twelve months volunteers would go home. The spirit of volunteering was dying out, while the government was slumbering over its military preparations; when it was wakened by the news that McClellan was ready to advance on Richmond, and, except the thinned ranks of the volunteer battalions, whose term of service was expiring, there was nothing between them and destruction.

The Confederate authorities do not seem to have been more provident as to the material than the personnel for the army. It was known that the Confederacy was exceedingly bare of all weapons, save sporting fire-arms. General Floyd, lately United States Secretary of War, in making room in the Northern armories for the new and improved weapons now adopted, had, indeed, lately sent 115,000 old pattern arms, out of the 500,000 at the North, to Southern arsenals; but some of these, as that at Fayetteville, North Carolina, were not within the Confederacy. The ordnance in the South consisted chiefly of old-fashioned cannon, mounted

and dismounted, at a few forts on the coast. To estimate the value of these antiquated weapons, great and small, we must remember that at this transition period, a short time had made, and was still making, rapid revolutions in the character of all kinds of fire-arms. There was not a cannon foundry or rifle factory, or powder mill in the Confederacy, and except at one point, great scarcity of powder. The Confederate authorities very properly kept many of their counsels and measures secret; and we cannot pretend to say how early they took steps, and what steps they took, to supply their wants. But we know that in the summer of 1861, while the Confederate ordnance department was, by continued applications, draining the magazine and arsenal of South Carolina of ammunition, ordnance and small arms, the ordnance department of that State could not ascertain that the government had yet opened any considerable source of supply for itself.

As late as the spring of 1862, the scarcity of arms was so great that the Governor of Georgia and some persons in Virginia suggested the arming of some of the infantry with pikes. It cannot be said that this scarcity was an unavoidable consequence of the blockade; for afterwards, when the blockade had become more rigid, arms of all kinds were imported in large numbers, and, when added to those taken from the enemy, the supply was sufficient, and the arms generally excellent of their kind. Yet some curious blunders were made; among others, a shipment was received in 1862 of 10,000 British arms, invoiced "patent 1851." Thus, some years after the infantry of every civilized country were armed with the Minie rifle, and after many Enfield rifles and other improved weapons had been imported into the country, the Confederacy was still importing "Brown Bess," the long discarded smooth-bore English rifle.

In proof that some persons at least long foresaw that "secession meant war," and that, while presenting the olive branch with the left hand, it should grasp its weapon with the right, we will exhibit a page from the secret history of secession. For, although secession was not the fruit of a conspiracy, yet, like most grave events, it has secret or little known chapters in its history.

As early as 1850, when South Carolina, aggravated by the aggressions and insults of the North, was burning with the secession fever, a majority of both Houses of the Legislature were, or seemed, bent on calling a convention to take the State out of the Union. A few, a very few, of the most earnest secessionists, seeing that others viewed the matter solely in its political or legal, and not in its military aspect, strenuously opposed the calling of a convention of the people, until a considerable appropriation should be made for arming the State; and they carried their point. Chilled, however, by the lukewarmness of the other Southern States, the fever fit passed off, and no attempt was made to leave the Union. Again, in the summer of 1860, a few, a very

few, ardent secessionists, instead of laboring to bring about secession, devoted all their energies to preparing that State, and the whole South, for it. It was up-hill work, for the politicians, to a man, looked only to the political movement, and not an inch beyond it. Yet, these few so far succeeded as to have some measures of military preparation taken in anticipation of secession. The Governor was induced, without waiting for legislative sanction, to have the heavy ordnance, procured in 1861, put into order for service, at a heavy expense, and ammunition provided for it. But for the precious time thus saved, the State could not have invested Fort Sumpter, and closed the harbor of Charleston against the naval power of the North. In addition to these timely preparations of material of war, before the State seceded, a plan was urged upon the State government for engrafting on the militia organization a volunteer system, that would come home to any man's door, requiring each battalion of the militia to put its quota in the field, for instruction, preparatory to active service, and preparing it to sustain the strength of its quota by drafts or volunteers.

Without vouching for its truth, we will tell an anecdote illustrating the views entertained at the beginning of the war. While Congress was in session at Montgomery, President Davis asked General Henningsen how much powder he thought should be provided against the emergency. The General suggested 900,000 pounds, and the President laughed at his extravagant estimate. Yet the President was one of those who looked forward to war, though little foreseeing the proportions it would assume. Before this time, some persons had had foresight and influence enough to collect, at Charleston alone, nearly 300,000 pounds. It must not be supposed that any of these preparations were made simply with a view to the defence of South Carolina. No one imagined that this State could stand long alone, or would have occasion so to stand.

It is needless to say much as to the naval preparations of the Confederate government. Naval officers and the country at large seem to have agreed that a dilatory inefficiency characterized the administration of that department. In truth, it was beset by great difficulties, and the Secretary of the Navy was not the man to overcome difficulties promptly. It was yet more a transition period in the character of naval armaments than in those for the land service. The great naval powers were engaged in ship-building projects and experiments, and had yet arrived at no certain results. In the uncertainty as to what class of vessels would prove most efficient for our defence, some money was thrown away and more precious time was lost. The character of the country and the population afforded small facilities for great naval preparations, especially when iron and complicated and costly machinery entered so prominently into their composition. Moreover, we doubt whether the necessary funds were promptly

put at the command of the department. It was obvious that the resources of the South for the creation of a naval force, could not rival those of the North. Under these circumstances, the naval efforts of the Confederacy were very properly divided between two different objects: First, the purchasing and equipping of fast steamers, many of which might introduce supplies of military material in defiance of the attempt to blockade the coast; while others, more strongly armed, should destroy the Yankee commerce wherever it could be found without protection. If the necessary funds had been promptly provided, little time was needed to carry out these measures. Secondly, by the construction at home or abroad of iron-clad vessels that might aid in the defence of the most vital points accessible to naval attack. Something was done in both branches of this naval policy. The achievements of the Merrimac was a startling novelty in war, and the fast steamers of Semmes, Maffet, and others, did good service for the South. But in general, the productions of the navy department were wanting in efficiency, or were six months or a year behind hand, and consequently of little or no avail. This contributed to, if it did not cause, the loss of New Orleans, with all the fatal consequences of its fall.

We will dwell more fully on the ultimate effects of all this want of due and timely preparation, of which we have hitherto spoken, after having considered another branch of our subject.

(To be continued.)

ART. XI—RECOLLECTIONS OF MEXICO; OR, ROAD AND MOUNTAIN.

(Continued from June Number.)

CHAPTER XI.

A VISIT TO THE TOP OF THE PYRAMID OF CHOLULU—A FESTIVAL OF THE CHURCH HELD THEREON—BISHOPS, PRIESTS, FRIARS AND PEOPLE, FLOCK TO THE TOP—FRANCISCO APPEARS IN A NEW CHARACTER—THE CHURCH ON THE PYRAMID AND ITS EMBELLISHMENTS—DESCRIPTION OF THE PYRAMID; ITS GREAT ANTIQUITY—PORTRAIT OF THE GOD QUETZALCOATL—NUMBER OF HUMAN VICTIMS SACRIFICED—THE MEXICANS AS CANNIBALS—SPECULATION AS TO THE MODE OF WORSHIP AMONG THE ANCIENT INHABITANTS OF AMERICA—DISCREPANCY IN THE MEASUREMENT OF THE HEIGHT OF THE PYRAMID AS MADE BY HUMBOLDT AND GENERAL BEAUREGARD.

The morning was far advanced before we had finished breakfast, and already groups of gayly dressed Mexicans were mounting the steps leading to the church on the pyramid, among whom were a sprinkling of all grades of the clergy, from the humble

gray friar, whose sandalled feet and threadbare garments, gave token of, at least, outward poverty, to the high dignitary of that branch of the priesthood known as the secular clergy, whose glossy broadcloth, well polished boots, and shining sombrero, were evidence of a very different condition, and in strong contrast to the humbler garments of their brethern of the monastic order.

A pontifical high mass was to be sung at ten o'clock by the Bishop of Puebla, assisted by a host of clergy; a ceremony at all times most imposing, but on this occasion, judging from the number of assistants, was to be particularly so. It was our intention to be present, but some of the party lingered so long over their toilet, influenced, no doubt, by the great number of the gentler sex who were out in all their finery, that on gaining the top of the pyramid, we found the church, not only thronged, but the space surrounding it packed so closely with human beings, that any attempt at obtaining an entrance was out of the question. Under these circumstances, we concluded to occupy our time in rambling about the place, viewing whatever objects of interest presenting themselves.

While making our way among a number of dark-eyed señoritas and gayly dressed cavaliers, on the outskirts of the crowd, in order to reach the opposite side of the church, I was accosted by a respectably dressed Mexican, the quality of whose garments, neatly trimmed beard, and sleek plump face, topped off with a hat well garnered with shining silver cord, denoted one in easy circumstances. This individual addressed me by name, making, at the same time, a ceremonious bow, as I approached. Surprised at being accosted by one who seemed an utter stranger, I returned the salutation, enquiring, at the same time, where it was I had the pleasure of his acquaintance.

"Ah, señor," replied the man, with a grin, "have you so soon forgotten Francisco?"

Mirable Dictu! Here was a transformation of the most perfect kind. By what mysterious agency did this poor devil of a *vaquero*, who only the day before was hunted like a wild criminal through the streets of an Indian village, become so suddenly transformed into a portly and responsible individual?

"You seem surprised, señor. But I have a friend not far off," said he, nodding, and turning his eyes in the direction of the church, "that rarely fails me at a pinch."

My party had gone on, without even once recognizing him, I did not, therefore, stop longer than to express my satisfaction at the improvement in his condition. Pondering on the mutability of human affairs, of which I had such a striking example, I caught a glimpse of Mr. O'Reilly in close converse with a roguish looking señorita, whose sparkling black eye, and coquettish air, indicated that all the soft nonsense that plausible individual might pour into her ear, was not as likely to be received with as implicit faith as his vanity might lead him to suppose. The advantage,

however, was on his side, for he was, on the whole, not a bad looking fellow; he had, too, an air of open frankness always attractive to the fair sex; and his fair complexion, the freshness of which a Mexican sun had not entirely dimmed, was, not only attractive, but was, in a measure, a novelty to the dark-skinned donna. His religious sympathies also were strongly in his favor—a heretic was something dreadful in the eyes of the natives—though Mike was too intelligent not to perceive that Catholicity in Mexico savored rather of the sixteenth than the nineteenth century.

On again joining my companions, I found them seated on a spot that afforded a good view of the surrounding scene.

The church before us, was a plainly built structure, having an air of grace and lightness about the style, which the Spaniard, no doubt, borrowed from the Moor, who, in turn, borrowed of the Greek and Persian, giving rise to the Saracenic style of architecture of which the little church seemed to have stolen a feature. It was solidly built, however, as every structure in the country, above the rank of an adobe hut, is.

So numerous were the hands employed in carrying up, piecemeal, on their backs, the materials of which it is composed, to the top of this singular site for a church, that I was told there was scarcely an individual in the large crowd of natives then in and around the building, who was not a descendant of some one or another of those who had lent a hand, or rather a back, in its erection. As I ran my eye over its outlines, a large bird of prey came sailing through the air, and landed on one of the arms of the cross at the top. I would not draw attention to this trifling incident, but from the fact that the bird had a piece of flesh of some kind, and of considerable size, in its talons, dripping with gore, which actually ran down, and disfigured the, not so singular as suggestive, resting place it had chosen to make its bloody repast. The disfiguration we could discern even with the naked eye, but with the glass it was plainly visible, and afforded a plausible excuse for a long moral lesson to which the Doctor treated us, but of which it would be just as well, perhaps, to spare the reader the recital of. The bird, however, finding himself in a spot, usually so solitary, now disturbed by a multitude of what he might very well call his natural enemies, took to flight before the Doctor was half through, carrying his gory repast with him.

The interior of the church, which we afterwards visited, conformed to the exterior, in the absence of architectural embellishments; but there were others, of a religious nature, some of which were not in as good taste as American Catholics are in the habit of witnessing in their temples. A number of tawdry dressed effigies of saints, decked out in tinsel, whose painted faces and glass eyes stared the visitor out of countenance. Yet, though they may be unsightly enough in the eyes of the refined and educated, they are not so in those of the simple minded Indian, upon whom they

operate as the most perfect works of art may do on the cultivated mind. These images are, therefore, tolerated, and permitted to remain, by the higher classes, in deference to aboriginal taste, and are to be found in almost every church in Mexico. Objectionable as this gaudy display may be, how much more preferable is it, to see the poor native, kneel at the foot of the cross, or before an image of the virgin—rude though it be—and imbibe the humanizing influences of Christianity, than to witness the scalping knife and tomahawk of the unreclaimed savage of the North. This style of art was, however, I was informed, giving way before a better style of representation, as the Indian was gradually assimilating himself to the civilized race; or, it may be, because a better style of art is now more accessible.

If I were to give a description of the pyramid as it presented itself at the time of which I write—and, no doubt, as it is at present—I should describe it as a beautiful natural hill, covered with shrubbery and flowers. So completely covered with soil is the original structure, that trees of some size are growing on its sides, among which are four cedars, said to have been brought from Mount Lebanon.

The date of its erection is lost in obscurity, for it was found here when the Aztecs entered the valley. The god *Quetzalcoatl*, in whose honor it was erected, is described as a benevolent divinity, who dissipated the darkness of the age in which he lived, by a genius, perhaps hitherto unknown, and was, accordingly, deified by posterity. Be this as it may, the religious rites were not performed in the same pure spirit originally prescribed by him. Not only his altar, but all the altars of the Aztec gods were stained with human blood. Not less than six thousand victims are said to have been annually sacrificed upon their altars. Indeed, the great number of temples in and around ancient Cholula, seem to indicate that this number has not been over estimated. "High above them all rose this immense structure, with its undying fires flinging their lurid light far and wide over the capital, and proclaiming to the nations the dread and mystic worship of the god who was one day to return and resume his empire over the land." Cholula was what Mecca is among the Mahomedans, or Jerusalem among the Christians; it was, in fact, the holy city of *Anahuac*, and to it flocked, not only the indigent, but many of the kindred races who had temples of their own in the city.

"This city of *Churultecal*" (Cholula), says Cortes, in one of his dispatches to Charles the Fifth, "is situated on a plain, and contains about twenty thousand houses, within the body of the town, and as many more in the suburbs. It is an independent state, and has its boundaries well defined; not yielding obedience to any sovereign, but governed in the same way as *Tascaltecal*. The inhabitants are better clothed than the *Tlascalans*, in some respects, as the superior classes of citizens all wear cloaks over their other dress, similar in shape, material and bordering, to

"those of Africa, but unlike them, in being provided with pockets. Since the late troubles, they have been, and continue, true and faithful vassals of your royal name, and, I believe, they will remain so hereafter. This State is very fertile under cultivation, as there is much land, most of which is well watered; and the exterior of the city is more beautiful than any in Spain, as it contains many towers, and is situated upon a plain. And I assure your majesty that I have counted from a mosque or temple, four hundred mosques, and as many towers, all of which are of mosques in the city.* This city is more suitable for Spaniards to inhabit than any of the towns we had yet seen (he had not yet seen the city of Mexico), as it has unoccupied lands, and water for cattle, which none of the other have that we have seen."†

And yet, as we surveyed the surroundings from the top of this ancient structure, it was almost impossible to realize the fact that such a city could have existed at so, comparatively, recent a date as that of the time of Cortes. Not a vestige remains. The few humble structures that comprise the present Cholula do not represent even a remnant of it, for they are all modern. Of what materials could it have been constructed? Even adobe brick, one would imagine, could hardly have resolved itself into its original elements so completely in so short a time. The pyramid stands as firm and solid as on the day of its erection. It remains. Why could not so splendid a city, or at least some vestige of it? We have had no account of an eruption from *Popocatepetl* to warrant the supposition of its being buried, which, if it were, would also bury, or partly bury, the pyramid, which is not the case, for the soil that covers it would not average, perhaps more than four or five feet. If collateral evidence did not go to prove its existence, it would be difficult to believe it was not the creation of Cortes' imagination, or at all events, that he greatly exaggerated its importance.

"The figures of the idols," says the same authority, "in which these people believe, surpass in stature a person of more than ordinary size; some of them are composed of a mass of seeds

* Describing one of the temples of Mexico, Cortes says: "Among these temples there is one which far surpasses all the rest, whose grandeur of architectural details no human tongue is able to describe; for within its precincts, surrounded by a lofty wall, there is room enough for a town of five hundred families. Around the interior of this enclosure there are handsome edifices, containing large halls and corridors, in which the religious persons attached to the temple reside. There are full forty towers, which are lofty and well built, the largest of which has fifty steps leading to the main body, and is higher than the tower of the principal church of Seville. The stone and wood of which they are constructed are so well wrought in every part that nothing can better be done; the interior of the chapels containing the idols, consists of curious imagery wrought in stone, with plastered ceilings, and wood-work carved in relief, and painted with images of monsters and other objects. * * * There are three halls in the grand temple which contains the principal idols; these are of wonderful extent and height, and admirable workmanship, adorned with figures sculptured in stone and wood; leading from the halls are chapels with very small doors, to which the light is not admitted, nor any person except the priests, and not all of them. In these chapels are the images of the idols, although many of them are found outside."

† Folsom's Translations of Cortes' Descriptions.

"and leguminous plants, such as are used for food, ground and mixed together, and kneaded with the blood of human hearts taken from the breasts of living persons, from which a paste is made in sufficient quantity to form large statues. When these are completed, they make them offerings of the hearts of other victims, which they sacrifice to them, and besmear their faces with blood."

The base of this enormous mound is one thousand four hundred and twenty-three (1,423) feet long, double that of the great pyramid of Cheops. Some idea may be formed of its dimensions when the square on which it stands measures about forty acres, and the platform on the top is one acre in extent. "On this platform," on the spot where the church now stands, stood the sumptuous temple in which the image of the Mystic God of the Air, with ebon features, unlike the fair complexion which he bore upon earth, wearing a mitre on his head waiving with *plumes of fire*, with resplendent collar of gold round his neck, pendants of mosaic turquoise in his ears, a jeweled sceptre in one hand, and a shield curiously painted, the emblem of his "rule over the wind, in the other."

ART. XII—DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE.

1.—THE VALLEY OF THE MISSISSIPPI IN THE CONVENTION OF THE NATIONAL BOARD OF TRADE.

The inability of Congress to manufacture Presidents and punish all heterodoxy in politics, has rendered the Commercial interests very important. They have, therefore, organized conventions, at which the wishes of the merchants and manufacturers may be digested and made known. These conventions are, in fact, committees of Congress. The National Board of Trade assembled in its first session at Philadelphia. Its next session will be held in Cincinnati. The attendance was large, and the reception by Philadelphia, in the highest degree liberal and enthusiastic. They were banquetted, fêted, taken on boating excursions, and escorted through the iron and coal regions of the State, by a committee of the Philadelphia Board of Trade.

These things indicate a separate and active organization of the mutual interests of the country, independent of Congress, which is too slow a body for a progressive people. Very soon the Board of Trade will send in its messages, like a commercial President, and Congress will be compelled to pass their recommendations at once. For the constituents of this Board are the constituents of Congress. The recent suggestions of the committee will be adopted by the representatives of the North-west, in Congress, and can but have a great influence on their actions. We copy some resolutions of peculiar consequence to the North-west and to New Orleans. It must be obvious that the policy therein advocated, must make New Orleans the great *entrepot* of the Eastern and Western India trade with the upper valley. We commend the resolutions introduced by the committee on Material Interests, by Mr. Fosdick, Mr. Blow, and Mr.

Hoffman, as covering the whole wants of the West. We give the proceedings of the Trade Convention, so far as it relates to these topics.

COMMERCE OF THE LAKE CITIES.

General Walbridge, of New York, said that while Pittsburg had a representation, the great chain of cities lying along the lakes were entirely deprived. The internal trade of these cities is greater than the whole foreign commerce of the seaboard cities. Last year, a commerce of \$600,000,000 passed through Buffalo alone. Few cities are so wealthy as Toledo, and a contest is going on between it and Chicago as to which shall be the empire city of the West. Every year the population of Europe is pouring westward to settle those great and fertile plains that are the wonder of the world.

In thirty years New York will outstrip London, and in thirty years more the great city may be St. Louis, Chicago, Toledo, or some other city yet unbuilt. There will be a denser population than there is now on the inhabitable globe. There is arable land enough to more than contain this population. In fifty years more there will be a great city on the shores of Lake Superior, through which will flow the commerce of the world, and which will rival any city now existing in the East.

The Hon. H. T. Blow, of St. Louis, chairman of the committee on the material interests and relations of the country, submitted the following resolutions:

Resolved, That the interests of the millions inhabiting and to inhabit the Mississippi Valley, require the adoption by the Federal government, of the following among other resolutions:

1. The improvement by national and international appropriation, of all the outlets of the valley, whether by the lakes, canals, or other improvements to the East, or by the removal of every obstacle to navigation upon the Mississippi and its tributaries; such appropriation should only be limited in amount by the completion of the several works referred to.

2. The improvement of the communication between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by canals and railroads across the Isthmus of Central America, such works to be constructed on national account, and to be under national protection solely.

3. The subvention of steam lines for postal and commercial communication between New Orleans and the principal ports of Mexico, Insular, Central, and North America.

4. The review of all commercial treaties between the United States and all the nations holding sovereign authority on or over the Southern States of this continent for the purpose of reciprocal trade.

Resolved, That a natural highway, formed by the chain of great lakes, having upon its borders a population numbering several millions, and reaching, as it does, half across the continent, requires the attention of Congress, for reasons as strong as can be urged in favor of the building of the Pacific Railroad, and the cities and communities depending upon this natural chain of trade call for the early removal of all obstacles to the free passage of the largest vessels from Lake Superior to Lake Ontario.

Referred to Executive Council.

The same committee reported the following:

Whereas, The Kansas Pacific Railway has reached the limit of its government aid, a point on the Plains 411 miles west of the Missouri River; and whereas, unless additional government aid is immediately given to the enterprise, a large organized force of trained laborers, capable of building 300 miles per year, must be disbanded and scattered; and whereas, this line of railway is one of those great national enterprises which are too vast to be wholly accomplished by private capital; and whereas, its extension to the Pacific has been shown by a carefully prepared report, just made by the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives, to be a military necessity as well as a source of vast public economy in the transportation of mails, troops and military sup-

plies; and whereas, it is known by the history of this as well as of other nations, that commercial prosperity exists in proportion to the development of internal communication; therefore,

Resolved, By the National Board of Trade, that it is the duty of Congress to promptly pass such a bill as will, in conjunction with private capital, accomplish the extension and early completion of the Kansas Pacific Railway through New Mexico and Arizona to the Pacific coast.

Resolved, That if, for any reason, Congress shall, at this session, deem it inadvisable to vote a loan of the public credit to the roadway through to the Pacific, aid should be granted to it without delay as far as the Rio Grande, in New Mexico, thus bringing into market and opening to early settlement millions of acres of the public domain, now inaccessible, uninhabited and unproductive to the treasury, and giving cheap and rapid transportation to and from the rich mines of Colorado and New Mexico, thereby guaranteeing their development and the vast augmentation of the taxable wealth of the nation, the large reduction of the public expenditures, the peaceable solution of the Indian question, and the diminution of the military forces now necessary to protect our extended frontier.

It was said that as the resolutions were very important, affecting the interests of the whole country, they should be properly debated, and as no time could be spared to do so during the present session, a motion was made to refer them to the Executive Council.

The motion was unanimously agreed to.

Mr. Davis, of Toledo, presented the following resolution which was also referred to the Executive Council:

Resolved, That the convention recommend to Congress to provide by law, that from this date no national bank shall be allowed to sell any part of the gold received from the government, as interest upon the bonds pledged for its circulation, until such time as the entire amount of the reserve required by law to be kept by the bank shall be made up of coin.

Mr. Fosdick, of New Orleans, submitted the following resolutions, stating that if the scheme which they were intended to prevent was successful, it would prove very detrimental to New Orleans and the cities lying on the Mississippi River:

Whereas, A bill is now pending in Congress, having for its object the granting of a charter to certain individuals for the purpose of constructing a canal or channel through Pass l'Outre, one of the outlets of the Mississippi River to the sea, with the right to collect tonnage duties or toll from all vessels making use of the same; and whereas, the imposition of such a tax would be a serious detriment to the carrying trade of the country, by necessarily increasing the cost of transportation on the products and manufactures of all sections; therefore, be it

Resolved, That we recommend to the National Board of Trade the adoption of these resolutions, to be transmitted to Congress:

Resolved, That the Mississippi River, being a national highway, should always be kept free from its highest navigable point to its outlet, and no charge of any nature whatever should ever be exacted from the shipping navigating its waters.

Resolved, That our Senators and Representatives in Congress be respectfully requested to oppose the passage of any such bill; that they be requested to urge the passage of a bill for the removal of all obstacles to the navigation of the Mississippi River and its tributaries—the work to be done under the direction of government officers, and not, as heretofore, by contract.

EDITORIAL.

CONFEDERATE BLUNDERS.

We desire to put our criticisms of this paper in a form as comprehensive as possible. No nation is prepared for war that is not prepared for blunders. To expect that a programme will be carried out without an error, is to attribute infallibility to human designs. No nation has ever prosecuted a war without committing some error which it would not repeat. But a nation powerful of resources can counteract the effect of such errors, by falling back on its substantial means of military or political salvation.

Can any one say that in the late war the United States committed no blunders? We apprehend there is not an impartial citizen who will defend all the political, diplomatic and military movements of Mr. Lincoln. To have called for but 75,000 men, was a blunder that encouraged the dubious States to engage in the war. Looking at that number as the maximum army to be encountered, they naturally thought such a force could be repelled. To advance on Richmond without a pioneer corps was a blunder which was never repeated by the Federals. The whole campaign of McClellan was—unsuccessful. General Banks committed a blunder in running against Stonewall Jackson, and supplying the Confederates with arms and stores. General Grant lost an indefinite number of men in his Wilderness campaign, which it is said might have been saved by adopting another line of advance. Mr. Lincoln expressed grave doubts whether the act of emancipation was not "a mistake."

These are a few specimens of such mistakes as any government may make, but such as none but a strong government can repair. Suppose we add to these losses that of the commercial marine of the United States. Suppose we estimate the \$4,000,000,000 which, according to Mr. Stevens, has been sunk in the war, without including in the estimate the labor and life lost. How could any except a very powerful nation stand such ruinous

losses? Of course every dollar and every life lost in this estimate may have been a blunder; but then, the nation was strong enough to carry its blunders and their consequences.

On the contrary, the South had adopted certain ideas of administrative policy, which excluded public enterprises, mixed industry and accumulated capital. It was deemed perhaps safer to rely on foreign intervention and domestic party diplomacy than to open mines, build ships, employ the people or retain the profits produced by one mode of labor in the price paid for the products of others. As a consequence, those States which had all the capital, all the credit, all the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States—those States which had manufactures and immigration—were more powerful than those which wanted all these elements of power.

Why was our military system such a failure? Was it because we resorted to conscription when we should have "drafted?" Was it because there was too much or too little of West Point in our strategy and tactics? The United States had all these troubles, and infinitely more. If we had desertion and favoritism, did not the armies of the United States sometimes dwindle to skeletons from the same causes? Were there not stampedes which were checked by armies behind armies? It seems one "blunder of the Confederacy" that where we recruited one foreigner, our enemy recruited two. The blunder was certainly committed long before the Confederacy. It was the blunder which would not make a canal, railroad or turnpike from a Southern port into the Northwestern territory. The people of the North employed the gift lands of the nation to attract European numbers, and these numbers furnished the recruits of which the article complains.

Then, under our system, we had a population numbering one-third of our aggregate, that could not be trusted with a gun. They made provisions, it is true, and behaved with much fidelity,

but nevertheless many of the men ran away, leaving their wives and children to be fed by us, and at last, as teamsters, soldiers and fatigue corps, they lent to the Federal army an aid of 200,000 men. This was no blunder of the Confederacy. It was the result of a doctrine always taught and of which the Confederacy was the result. This heavy percentage of disaffection and even of hostility the Confederacy was obliged to carry. Those who taught that with the admitted advantages of slavery, it was an element of military strength, should assume the responsibility of this obstacle to our success.

It is true, a better system of collecting and transporting supplies might have been adopted, but it would have puzzled any Commissary General and Quartermaster to have collected and sent forward the products of a country almost uncultivated and almost without the means of transportation. There were in the South very few railroads, and those were so far worn out that there were on one of the principal roads but one very indifferent locomotive to every twelve lineal miles of road, whereas the proper proportion is, we think, a locomotive to every two miles. There were no workshops capable of turning out a new locomotive, except at one or two points. We have known rails cut and welded in the forge to repair the tracks. Then, the horses throughout the country had been taken for cavalry or artillery, or other military purposes. The roads had not been worked on for years. The collection and delivery of supplies was almost impossible.

We need not contrast with this the immense preparations of the enemy for these indispensable facilities of war. We have no doubt but that the waste, destruction and losses of the enemy would have been sufficient to have enabled us to have prosecuted our defence successfully, if it had been all within our control when wanted.

We can readily explain why the United States succeeded. With the industrial system common to most civilized nations, the Northern States had all the material elements of war. The loss of the Southern home market left the industrial interests without a demand for their productions. The Federal government became their cus-

tommer and patron. The war was their market. The blockade and Admiral Semmes was their protective tariff. It was obvious they must sell to the government or let their productions rot, or rust on their hands. They sold to the government and took its certificates in payment, or the chance of payment. The success of the Federal arms made the certificates good; their failure made it worthless. Hence the North maintained the war. It gave them wages, food and a premium price for their commodities. Food was never cheaper or wages better in the North than during the war; nominally, it may be, but really the whole pay of officer and soldiers, the whole army expenditure for ships, steamboats, horses, wagons; for meat, bread and whisky, corn, oats and forage; for all the fuel and ironware of war; for all the women's work of making and sewing cloth, with the innumerable items of military preparation, was expended among the people of the United States.

We will not contrast the condition of our non-combatant population during the same period. But such a picture of patriotism, enduring such want, suffering and separation, has rarely been seen in a struggle for the freedom and existence of States, as was exhibited in the South.

The blunder of not having men, money, food (fuel for our ocean steamers), or transportation, was not that of the Confederate leaders. It was a blunder and a burden bequeathed them by their predecessors. That the Confederate political leaders were not men of the resources needed by the emergency we may admit, but they were the representatives of the exclusive ideas which elected them. Under the elective system, the suffragans are responsible for the blunders of those they may have chosen to govern them. Whatever may be said of the Confederate leaders, they were not usurpers. For ourselves, we neither are, nor have ever been, Federalists, nor consolidationists, either of the Confederacy or Union. We never admitted the power or right of Congress to incorporate a bank or enact a tariff for protection, or invade, with internal improvements, the sovereignty of a State. But we always knew that the rights of a State could alone be pro-

served by the power of a State, and that this power depended on the possession of material strength. We never believed in the protection of Presidents, since they may be assassinated, or may change their opinions. We have always advocated the organization of all the elements of State power, by the resources and credit of the State. Just as Pennsylvania and New York have effected the object of protecting their rights. Our liberties are not safe in the keeping of one man, or of a set of men, but in a numerous, intelligent and prosperous people.

The only blunder we can see in the Confederate councils was, that they had none of the elements with which successful wars are waged, except a just cause and the courage and virtue of the people. We do not like to hear them condemned, for two reasons. 1. They had as much at stake, personally, as any one else. 2. To fasten on *them*, the blame or failure, tends to divert the popular mind of the South from the true causes of failure. It is in this last apprehension that we have stated our dissent from the views of our respected contributor.

We shall assume the privilege of having as good right to speak to the South as any one in it. We must remind our contributor of one illustration which marks the difference between State rights on the basis of physics, and State rights on the basis of metaphysics. He repeatedly adverts to the political foresight of South Carolina, to her preparations for war, and to the dismemberment of the Southern States. This gives a right to vindicate those States, by a single remark. We accept the State right doctrine of South Carolina, except that we never believed in nullification. But, we deem it unfortunate that the purity of her purposes was not sustained by an adequate physical preparation. It has, therefore, resulted that her political situation is very deplorable. The negro numbers have the ascendancy, and they cannot be counterbalanced or controlled as in other Southern States—Georgia, for instance—by white people, capital and machinery. With the State right doctrines of Carolina, and the physical ability of Georgia or New York to maintain them, we should have a per-

manent return to the old state of affairs included in the first Federal Constitution.

The corollary proposition which we may hereafter discuss is, "How shall the blunders of our failure be corrected?" To prevent any idea that we wish, or deem it necessary, to try the fight over, we will say that we deem the preservation of this American Union the first element of Southern prosperity, and that of Southern freedom, in or out of the Union.

Under and by virtue of the Union justly administered, we look forward to see the South adopt all the means of modern progress, and assume its proper relation to other States and nations, on the basis of wealth, numbers, and intelligence.

ALBANY COTTON GIN MANUFACTURING COMPANY.—The gradual union of interest between the cotton spinners and cotton planters, has interested the Northern machinist in putting up the best possible machinery for ginning and otherwise preparing raw cotton for the mill and for market. This Company, whose extended advertisement renders any explanation on our part unnecessary, presents certificates of economy and efficiency which deserve consideration. We will cheerfully communicate with them in regard to any orders or enquiries which our factors and planters may be disposed to make in regard to these valuable improvements in the cotton gin and condenser.

BOOK NOTICES.—*Camors*, by Octave Feuillet.—We are indebted to Blelock & Co., Publishers, Canal street, New Orleans, for a copy of this interesting volume. It is very handsomely got up, in paper, printing, and binding. Count Camors is a polished and unprincipled man, who seeks to subject to his purpose every man or woman in whom he may be sufficiently interested, to destroy them. As a result, he leads a dissipated life, and dies a miserable death. The descriptive powers of this popular author are very fine. He

depicts Parisian society with a master hand, and his sketches of scenery and incidents are in the highest degree graphic. The work may be read with great interest and instruction by all who have the discrimination to separate the moral which it conveys, from the seductive medium through which it is communicated. As a model of style, invention, and social description, we commend Camors to the literary reader of the South.

We have, also, from the well established house of Krull & Dickey, 106 Canal street, a school-book which, without being sectional, is in every respect safe for Southern readers. It is Capt. M. F. Maury's "First Lessons in Geography," and his "Geographical Series: the World we Live in." These works, by the most eminent cosmographer since the death of Humboldt, are eminently useful at the present moment. The philosophical doctrines taught are sound, the historical references impartial, and the style eminently plain and sensible. We commend these volumes to the teachers of the South as in every respect what they ought to be.

IRON AND HEMP TIES FOR COTTON—
The Arrow Tie.—Our readers will appreciate the controversy which has for some years past existed between the hemp and iron interests in regard to the best material for securing cotton in bales. The former interest has occasionally endeavored to obtain a little government aid in the strife by proposing an increase of duty on hoop iron. The iron interest has, perhaps, been equally vigilant, for the importance of the object has been sufficient to justify great effort on the part of each.

Incidentally we may express our gratification that the introduction of the iron tie tends to encourage, even in a small degree, the iron interest of the South, by the establishment at Selma and other points, of iron tie manufacture. It's a natural consequence of this controversy that many valuable improvements should have been made in the new mode of securing cotton with iron.

Not only is this iron tie adopted generally in the Southern States of the Union, but also in Egypt and India, where a considerable discrimination is made in the rate of freights in favor of iron bands, on account of being more compact and much less liable to loss, waste, stealage or destruction by fire.

It is a significant fact, also, that the Boards of Underwriters have reduced the tariff of insurance on all iron-bound cotton. This resolution is understood to have resulted from the demonstrated superiority of iron ties in the recent large fires at Savannah, Georgia, Jefferson, Texas, and upon several burning steamers, where iron-bound cotton was saved, while that bound in rope was destroyed.

Another item of no inconsiderable interest is the economy claimed by iron men. Iron is said to cost much less, at present, than rope (from 2 to 2½ cents per pound less), and even at these prices, hemp can be more profitably applied to the manufacture of bagging and other uses than to rope.

It is but just to say that the hemp party allege certain objections against iron ties, but this comparison has been remitted to practical planters and shippers, who will decide it in their own way. In the meantime, it is an undoubted fact that the trade in iron ties has increased with such remarkable rapidity as now to have become a very extensive branch of commerce.

Among the various cotton fastenings, one of the most widely known and universally approved is the Arrow Tie, patented and manufactured by an old citizen of New Orleans, Mr. J. J. McComb, now residing in Liverpool. So extensive, as we learn, has the trade become, that in order to supply the demand, agencies for the Arrow Tie have been established at New York, Savannah, Charleston and Galveston, from which merchants in the interior are supplied; and by recent arrangements entered into with the owner of the patent for the self-fastening Buckle Ties, these fastenings will also be furnished through the same agencies.

The great merit of this patent consists in its extreme simplicity of

adjustment and its great tenacity of tie. It is a plain clasp of superior power.

The general controlling agency of the Arrow Tie is with Mr. H. T. Bartlett, at No. 43 Carondelet street, New Orleans. This gentleman adds to a personal experience of many years in the cotton trade of New Orleans the advantage of having travelled extensively in Europe in connection with his present duties. Those who may call on him will find a courteous, intelligent and instructive representative of an interest of great importance to the agricultural, manufacturing and commercial interests of the South and of the world.

SORGO MILLS AND EVAPORATORS.—

The great growth of the sorgo, and the importance of its manufacture, have imparted to the inventions for grinding and granulating the cane juice, a degree of importance not heretofore anticipated. We recommend to all our readers in the valley of the Mississippi and Ohio the patents of Cook and Victor as the best means of utilizing the saccharine matter of the sorgo. While laboring for the restoration of the levees and of the sugar culture of Louisiana, we yet prefer that our fellow-citizens of the North-west should develop any latent capacity they may have for producing their own sugar. We are no "dog in the manger," and therefore advise all interested to examine the machinery and chemical process in the advertisement of Blymer, Horton & Co., of Cincinnati, who will moreover furnish railway power, threshers, grain drills, and all the improved implements which cheapen labor and increase the profit of agriculture.

FLEMING'S PATENT MEDICINE DEPOT.

As the season approaches when the constitution requires reinforcement for

the fight with the climate, it becomes important to adopt those curatives which protect the system without impairing its ability for active business. Under this view, the magazine of Fleming becomes an institution of great importance. Inspect his catalogue, question his salesman or your consulting physician, and you will find rarely an infirmity for which he has not a specific. Any acute disease can be instantly relieved, any chronic disorder (except the appetite for office) can be relieved by some one of his patent medicines. Read his advertisement and you will perceive that he is the friend of the people, as well as of the medical profession. He keeps people at work, and so enables them to pay the physicians, when they require such services as none except a physician or surgeon can render.

RHODES' SUPER-PHOSPHATE OF LIME.—

This valuable manure has received the endorsement of the South Carolina, Georgia and Alabama State Agricultural Societies, besides, all leading chemists in the United States; together with prominent planters who have tried it practically. It has also received the grand medal, at the great agricultural fair, Harrisburg, Pa., in 1863. It is time the Southern planter was resorting to all the agencies for cheapening labor, and improving the productive capacities of land. It costs as much to cultivate a poor acre as a rich one, hence the advantage of employing Rhodes' fertilizer, so that the planter may get the full worth of the labor he pays for. The cultivation of the earth with improved modes and implements of industry, will enable us to restore our staple culture, and give land owners, once more, a profit on agriculture, greater, perhaps, than under the old system. Read the advertisement of Geo. W. Sizer, Esq., sole agent for this super-phosphate, corner of Camp and Poydras streets, New Orleans.

DE BOW'S

SOUTHERN and WESTERN MONTHLY BUSINESS DIRECTORY.

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TO ADVERTISERS.—We have respectfully to remind merchants that the De Bow's Southern and Western Directory is a cheap and effective medium for coming before the public. It publishes 30,000 copies annually, which go chiefly to Southern and Western readers. It thus differs from other directories, because it repeats the advertisement twelve times a year, and thus goes to a large extent into many hands. The price is reasonable, being \$100 per annum, per page, with a proportional reduction of price as to space. One-fourth of this price is payable in advance. We are printing and publishing the Review in New Orleans, and solicit the patronage of the merchants to the extent of their interest.